Friday, November 30, 2012

Slovenia – Publicly-owned bank NLB announces plan to boost its share capital by € 375 mln but government denies it has the necessary funds; government to send to parliament proposed amendments to increase the authority of the central bank; Probanka registers net loss of € 30 mln for 9M 2012 due to provisions for NPLs; IMF issues notice and country report on Slovenia


On 28 November the management of Slovenia’s largest bank, the state-owned bank NLB (Nova Ljubljanska banka d.d.), announced that the bank’s supervisory board, in a meeting held on the previous day, had voted to call a general meeting of shareholders for 29 December in order to consider a proposal to increase the bank’s share capital by € 375 mln.

As of 30 September 2012 the bank’s capital consisted of 12,548,930 shares, and as of 30 June 2012 the book value of shares was € 90.3 per share.  As of 30 September the bank's largest shareholders were the Slovenian government (40.21%), the Belgian bank KBC Bank (22.04%), the national pension fund Kapitalska družba (9.99%), and the national remuneration fund Slovenska odškodninska družba (9.00%).  At 30 September 2012 NLB's market share in Slovenia in terms of total assets (tržni delež po bilančni vsoti) was 25.2%.

Sources:
NLB official announcement: Sporočila za javnost - 40. redna seja Nadzornega sveta NLB (2012-11-28)
NLB financial statements for 3Q 2012: Medletno poročilo - september 2012


Later that same day (28 November), the Minister of Finance, Janez Šušteršič, stated publicly that the Slovenian government does not have € 375 mln to spare to recapitalize NLB, and that in fact it might be in the state’s interest to sell its share in the bank.  Nevertheless, analysts note that recent results of NLB’s second-largest shareholder, the Belgian bank KBC, have not been positive enough that KBC would be able to invest any large part of the € 375 mln being sought.  Because Slovenia’s second-largest bank (NKBM) and third-largest bank will also need recapitalization, analysts and economists consider it most likely that the recapitalization of all three banks will come from Slovenian government funds.



Also on 28 November, the government of Slovenia adopted proposed amendments to the law on banking, which will now be sent to the National Assembly.  The amendments would clarify the role and powers of the central bank – Banka Slovenije – giving the bank, for example, the authority to force banks to recapitalize even if they do not wish to.



In another sign of Slovenian banking woes, on 30 November the commercial bank Probanka (Probanka, d.d., Maribor) published a brief summary of its financial results for 9M 2012, in which it indicated a net loss for the period (čisti dobiček/čista izguba poslovnega obdobja) of € 30.23 mln, in marked contrast to the modest net profit of € 1.70 mln earned in the year-earlier period.  While both interest income and income from fees/commissions were down from the year-earlier period, the major part of the loss came from provisions for impaired assets, which totaled € 36.66 mln during 9M 2012, four times the provisions in the year-earlier period (€ 9.16 mln).

On 30 September 2012 the bank’s total assets were € 1,077 mln – 2.3% of the total assets of the Slovenian banking system – down from € 1,155 in the year-earlier period.

Sources:


In other news, on 29 November the International Monetary fund published a short informational notice and a lengthy (56 pp.) country report on Slovenia.  The following is the entire text of the informational notice, approximately half of which deals with the banking system (emphasis as per original):

On November 21, 2012, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with Slovenia.
Background
With a loss of more than 8 percent of GDP, Slovenia experienced one of the largest economic contractions since 2008 among euro area countries. The timid externally-driven recovery observed in 2010 faded as export growth slowed, deleveraging picked up pace, and fiscal consolidation started. The recession intensified in 2012, as euro area growth decelerated, external financial conditions worsened, and private consumption growth turned negative. Unemployment reached 8.4 percent in August 2012. Inflation has been kept in check by weak demand and averaged below the euro area aggregate, more so in core indicators. The current account reached broad balance in 2011 and a moderate surplus is expected for this year, largely as a result of import compression. With stringent financial and economic conditions continuing in the euro area, deleveraging, and fiscal consolidation, staff expects the economy to contract by 2¼ percent in 2012 with growth resuming in the second half of 2013 led by the projected euro area recovery.
The performance of Slovenian banks deteriorated markedly in recent years as a result of the unfavorable operating environment. Bank asset quality worsened substantially since 2007, especially in publicly-owned banks. Of particular concern are loans to the over-indebted corporate sector. The increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) resulted in substantial impairment charges, leading to system-wide bank losses in the last two years and repeated downgrades of bank ratings. Although capital adequacy improved in 2011, many banks will need further capital increases. The loan-to-deposit ratio remains high, and banks have replaced lost external commercial funding with government deposits and ECB financing. Alongside an external assessment of the size of bank losses, the government is creating an asset management company to deal with NPLs and is elaborating a strategy to reform governance of publicly-owned banks.
The headline deficit is set to drop to around 3½ percent of GDP in 2012 from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2011 (excluding capital injections to publicly-owned banks and corporations), and the 2013 headline deficit target is 2.8 percent of GDP in spite of weaker-than-expected economic activity. The authorities target a structurally-balanced budget by 2015, with adjustment frontloaded in 2012 and 2013. Under the staff’s baseline scenario, which conservatively assumes a debt increase of about 11 percent of GDP in connection with bank restructuring, the debt-to-GDP ratio would peak around 70 percent of GDP around 2016 and gradually fall thereafter. However, Slovenia has one of the most adverse pension expenditure dynamics in the euro area, and further action will be required after the realization of current pension reform plans. After more than a year of absence from the long-term markets, the government cash position was alleviated thanks to a successful 10-year bond issuance in US dollars on October 19. This is Slovenia's first dollar-denominated bond since 1996.
Executive Board Assessment
Executive Directors noted that Slovenia’s economy is suffering from the negative feedback loops of recession, bank deleveraging, and corporate distress against a background of structural weaknesses, financial sector vulnerabilities, and weak domestic and external demand. They underlined the need for strong and prompt action to address these problems. In this regard, Directors considered appropriate the authorities’ emphasis on fiscal consolidation and their plans for ambitious and comprehensive structural reforms to restore macroeconomic and financial stability and economic growth. They looked forward to swift implementation of the reform agenda.
Directors welcomed the proposed establishment of a Bank Asset Management Company to address the build-up of nonperforming loans, stressing that timely implementation will be of the essence. Directors noted that publicly-owned banks may need more capital, while the corporate sector is highly leveraged. They encouraged the authorities to move decisively to restructure, recapitalize and ultimately privatize banks and corporations, which will also help strengthen governance. Directors welcomed the authorities’ efforts to implement the FSAP recommendations. In particular, they emphasized the importance of strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework and improving macroprudential oversight and crisis contingency arrangements.
Directors commended the progress with fiscal consolidation and the efforts to strengthen the fiscal framework. They supported the front-loaded, expenditure-based consolidation as necessary to bolster market confidence. They encouraged focusing on structural rather than on nominal targets, and endorsed the goal of a structural balanced budget by 2015 net of bank restructuring costs. Directors called for a strengthening of the quality of adjustment and fiscal governance, including through a constitutional structural balance rule with a debt brake and enhanced medium-term fiscal planning.
Directors emphasized the importance of structural reforms to ensure fiscal sustainability, enhance competitiveness, and spur growth. They considered the current pension reform proposals to be a step in the right direction, but observed that more decisive measures will be needed to ensure medium-term fiscal and debt sustainability. Directors welcomed the engagement with social partners on labor market reform, which is essential to reduce market segmentation and improve competitiveness. They also called for improvements to the business climate to attract foreign investment.



Below are excerpts from the country report, which enters into considerably greater detail than the informa­tional notice (emphasis as per original):


C. Financial Sector: Dealing with NPLs and Improving Bank Governance
11. The performance of Slovenian banks deteriorated markedly in recent years as a result of the unfavorable operating environment and weak governance. Bank asset quality worsened substantially since 2007, with a heavy concentration in the large publicly-owned banks. Of particular concern are loans to the over-indebted corporate sector, which is facing sluggish domestic and external demand. The largest firms, especially in the construction sector (mostly infrastructure), have been the worst hit. The increase in NPLs resulted in substantial impairment charges, leading to system-wide bank losses in the last two years and repeated downgrades of bank ratings with the largest publicly-owned banks losing investment grade.
12. Although capital adequacy improved in 2011, many banks will need further capital increases. The aggregate total capital adequacy ratio stood at 12 percent as of December 2011, up from 11.3 percent in 2010, mainly due to capital injections in six banks for €458 million and deleveraging. However, banks’ continuing losses are eroding their capital. To meet EBA requirements, the largest publicly-owned bank Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB), was recapitalized again by €383 million in June 2012, and further recapitalization of this and some other banks may be needed after the planned restructuring. While the recent capital injection included €320 million through a contingent convertible bond, the ECB has noted that it generally prefers issuances of shares against cash contributions for financial stability reasons. The authorities have taken note of this preference and plan to act accordingly.
13. Despite some deleveraging, banks are still heavily dependent on wholesale funding from abroad, and increasingly on the ECB. Although banks have lost access to external commercial funding since 2009, the loan-to-deposit ratio remains high at 137 percent at end-March 2012. Banks have replaced external funding with government deposits and ECB financing, which increased by €3.4 billion mostly as result of LTROs. Target2 liabilities have increased to over €5.0 billion. The ratio of domestic deposits to GDP has been broadly stable so far, and the government’s deposits are mostly long term. Thanks to the large use of the LTRO facility and the ample availability of ECB-eligible collateral, the bank liquidity position is still comfortable. However, further downgrades of the sovereign could reduce the pool of eligible assets and domestic deposits may decline in relation to GDP.
14. The authorities are moving to strengthen the financial sector broadly in line with FSAP recommendations. The FSAP noted that the risks to systemic financial stability stemmed mainly from the negative macroeconomic outlook and the high dependence of banks on external funding. With real estate being a major form of collateral, the real estate price risk is of particular concern.
15. The authorities announced a comprehensive plan to address financial sector vulnerabilities. The authorities have moved to obtain an external assessment of the size and distribution of bank losses, to create an asset management company, and to define a strategy for capitalizing and restructuring troubled banks and non-financial corporates.
·  Diagnostic process. According to the standard definition used by the Bank of Slovenia (i.e. assets with more than 90 days arrears) total NPLs were € 6.3 billion as of June 2012 (13.2 percent of classified claims). Based also on due diligence exercises (already completed for NLB and to be completed by the end of the year for Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor and Abanka), the government intends to transfer up to €3 billion of assets from the banks to the new asset management company (see below), comprising both non-performing and highrisk ones.
·   Bank Asset Management Company (BAMC). In October, the parliament voted the law on financial stability creating the BAMC as a public agency, which is subject to oversight by the supreme audit institution and the parliament. The new agency should be operational by the end-2012 or early-2013. The BAMC can issue a maximum €4 billion of governmentguaranteed bonds (about 11 percent of GDP). The acquisition price for impaired assets will be the “real long-term value,” following the EC State Aide guidelines. The BAMC will have the instruments and the power to seek a quick resolution of the impaired assets, be it by restructuring the corporate or by liquidating it and selling its collateral and assets. Bankruptcy procedures where the BAMC is involved are to be concluded within six months. The BAMC is to be wound down after five years, at which point the remaining assets will be establishing BAMC is to privatize the banks once they have been cleaned up and recapitalized. While public debt will increase when the BAMC’s bonds are issued, this debt should be partially repaid with the proceeds from the liquidation of assets, including the privatization of the banks and other corporations that end up in the BAMC’s portfolio.
·   Bank capitalization and restructuring. Banks needing recapitalization after selling their impaired assets to the BAMC will have to prepare a restructuring plan, which will be submitted to the EC within six months of receiving recapitalization. The government estimates that banks may need to be recapitalized for up to € 1 billion (2¾ percent of GDP) to cover the losses due to the difference between the book value of the transferred assets net of provisions and the actual price paid by the BAMC as well as future losses deriving from the possible worsening of the bank assets in the future.
·   The SSH. Also in October, the parliament passed a law to create the SSH to unify the management of all publicly owned corporations, clean up their finances, and define a strategy that includes the target stakes in different types of corporations and sectors, including full and partial privatizations. Addressing the financial weakness of the corporate sector is a necessary complement to the restructuring of the banks.
16. Yet the implementation of the plan as well as some of the FSAP recommendations will need the authorities’ strong effort. The steps taken thus far are substantial, but are just the initial ones.
·  Bank recapitalization and restructuring. The authorities and staff agreed that the BAMC should be independent and free of political pressures, appropriately funded, able to hire the best talent, fully accountable for its actions, transparent, and subject to external professional auditing. Staff noted that bringing banks back to a healthy state requires addressing the corporate sector debt overhang, possibly through debt to equity swaps. They should move at once to transfer the impaired assets out of the troubled banks and to subsequently recapitalize those banks. To determine capitalization needs in addition to those arising from the below-book value asset transfers to the BAMC, staff recommended thorough stress tests on the banks’ remaining assets. Staff welcomed the clear and short deadlines set in the law for the acquisition of the assets and their subsequent sale, as well at the provisions to reinforce the transparency of its governance. Staff also encouraged the authorities to engage at least one international expert in the board of the BAMC to ensure its effectiveness and the adoption of solid international practices.
·   Bank privatization and governance. Staff also encouraged the authorities to move quickly to privatize banks to bring about the needed change in their governance and commercial cultures. The changes in the management of the two largest banks may not be enough to end the public sector’s interference with the commercial orientation of banks. The authorities agreed that privatization is important but noted that reducing public ownership to below the blocking minority share of 25 percent requires broader political support.
·   Crisis preparedness. Staff recommended a prompt discussion and adoption of the draft Banking and Recovery and Resolution Acts, which enhance the powers and resources of the Bank of Slovenia to deal effectively with financial sector crises. These drafts provide adequate legal protection of bank supervisors in civil and criminal court proceedings, and empower the Bank of Slovenia to define the requirements for major acquisitions by banks, subjecting them to its approval. In addition, staff recommended periodic stress tests to monitor the quality of bank assets as well as capital adequacy as economic conditions continue to be challenging.



Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Cyprus – Bank of Cyprus releases financial results for first nine months of 2012; IMF expects to receive data on recapitalization needs of Cyprus banking system during first week of December – AMENDED


As per its earlier announcement of 16 November, on 28 November the largest commercial bank in Cyprus, Bank of Cyprus Public Co. Ltd. (Τράπεζα Κύπρου Δημόσια Εταιρία Λτδ), published its financial results for the first nine months of 2012.  The following is an excerpt from the English version of the management’s 11-page announcement summarizing the results (emphasis as per original):

Further deterioration in loan portfolio quality led to a significant increase in provisions for impairment of loans (€822 mn in the nine months of 2012, compared with €295 million for the nine months of 2011), resulting to losses after tax, excluding the impairment of Greek Government Bonds (GGBs) and the change in fair value of related hedging derivatives as well as the related deferred tax, of €291 mn compared to a profit of €254 mn for the nine months of 2011. Losses after tax and including the impairment of GGBs for the nine months of 2012 reached €211 mn compared to €793 mn in the nine months of 2011, which included significant losses from the GGBs impairment of about €1.046 mn.

As with the anticipatory “profit warning” announcement that the bank issued on 9 November, in the present document there is a fair amount of craftiness in the wording regarding the impact of Greek Government bonds (GGBs – Ομολόγων Ελληνικού Δημοσίου (ΟΕΔ)) on the results for the period.  The document insists on frequently lumping together impairment losses on GGBs and general provisions for impaired loans, at times giving the impression that a significant share of the huge leap in provisions for impaired loans/assets that took place in 9M2012 compared to 9M2011 (€295 mln → € 822 mln, an increase of € 527 mln or about 2% of the GDP of Cyprus) arose from continuing provisions for GGBs.  But an examination of the details shows that in 9M2012 bad GGBs did not increase the bank’s overall provisions but instead reduced them slightly, by € 80 mln:

Provisions for impairment of loans and advances (Προβλέψεις για απομείωση δανείων και απαιτήσεων):
Cyprus: (€ 315,432,000)
Greece: (€ 435,517,000)
Russia: (€ 44,944,000)
Other countries: (€ 25,771,000)
Total: (€ 821,664,000)

Impairment of GGBs and change in fair value of related hedging instruments after tax (Απομείωση ΟΕΔ και μεταβολή στην εύλογη αξία σχετικών παραγώγων αντιστάθμισης μετά τη φορολογία):
€ 80,134,000

Without the contribution of GGBs, the bank’s provisions for other impaired loans/assets would not be € 822 mln but € 902 mln.  And not all of the bank’s impaired-asset problems are due to Greece, since the provision for impaired loans in Cyprus surged from € 104 mln to € 315 mln between Sept. 2011 and Sept. 2012.  In fact during the first nine months of 2012 the bank lost money in all four of its operating segments:

Loss before tax (Ζημιές πριν τη φορολογία):
Cyprus: (€ 8,119,000)
Greece: (€ 284,782,000)
Russia: (€ 10,318,000)
Other countries: (€ 1,830,000)
Total: (€ 305,049,000)

Clearly the bank’s problems are much broader than just Greece or Cyprus.  The bank’s website informs us that the Bank of Cyprus Group – of which Bank of Cyprus Public Co Ltd is the head company – “currently operates through a total of 556 branches, of which 190 operate in Russia, 181 in Greece, 126 in Cyprus, 44 in Ukraine, 10 in Romania, 4 in the United Kingdom and 1 in the Channel Islands.”  The financial statements for 9M2012 reveal that besides after-tax losses in Cyprus, Greece, and Russia, the bank had an after-tax loss of € 7 mln in Romania, and only obtained after-tax profits in the UK (€ 3 mln), Australia (€ 3 mln, but the Australian operations have since been sold), and Ukraine (€ 1 mln).

Sources:
Bank of Cyprus website: Οικονομικά στοιχεία


In other news, on 29 November a press briefing was held in Washington, D.C., by Gerry Rice, Director of the IMF’s External Relations Department.  Below is an excerpt of the questions and answers concerning the situation in Cyprus:


QUESTION: The second question was about Cyprus. The government said that they are close to reaching a deal in December with European lenders and the IMF and even talk about an interest rate. I was wondering if you could comment on progress and what concerns you see. Thank you.

MR. RICE: You may have seen the joint statement from the E.U., the ECB, and the IMF that we issued last Friday, about productive discussions with the authorities on policy building blocks of the macroeconomic adjustment program. These include policies to strengthen public finances, restore the health of the financial system, and strengthen competitiveness so as to pave the way for the economy to return to sustained growth and financial stability. What I can tell you further is that these discussions are continuing with the authorities and our European partners on financing solutions consistent with debt sustainability. I do not have detail for you on further timing at this stage.

QUESTION: I have a follow-up on Cyprus. When will we see the results of the review of the banking sector? Do you have any idea?

MR. RICE: The preliminary estimate of banking capital needs is expected from PIMCO during the first week of December and these results will be instrumental in determining the financing envelope that would underpin a potential program with Cyprus. The results of the bottom up due diligence exercise are expected to be made public early in 2013.

QUESTION: So we have to wait to next year for the program on Cyprus?

MR. RICE: I do not have a date for you. As I say, we are in discussions. We have had the mission. We are in discussions. There is now this banking due diligence exercise and so we will be taking all that under consideration.

QUESTION: And the last question on Cyprus. Did Cyprus send final proposals? Do you have an idea or can you ask and tell us later?

MR. RICE: I will get back to you on that if we can.



Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant

Moldova – IMF issues memorandum on results of mission to Moldova, urges more action on NPLs


On 28 November the International Monetary Fund published a memorandum summarizing “the discussions held between the IMF mission and the Moldovan authorities in Chişinău during November 7-21, 2012.”  Below can be found some excerpts regarding the banking system.  (Emphasis as per original.)  Of some interest is the IMF’s present insistence on the need for banks to avoid new non-performing loans and to collect on existing ones, and on the need for the government to facilitate the sale of public property.  In particular, the IMF’s present desire to have Moldovan banks reduce their exposure to non-performing loans is in interesting juxtaposition with the IMF’s desire – expressed just one month previously (see earlier article in this column) – to have the share of credit (debt) to GDP in Moldova increase from 38% (end-2011) to 80-85%: “While remaining mindful of credit’s effects on inflation and the current account deficit, the authorities and staff concurred that credit growth can exceed nominal GDP growth by a few percentage points to facilitate steady convergence toward credit’s estimated equilibrium level of 80-85 percent of GDP from 38 percent at end-2011.”

[...]
6. While most banks remain sound, declining asset quality and the troubles of the majority state-owned Banca de Economii (BEM) are symptomatic of emerging risks. The nonperforming loans (NPL) ratio has increased from 11 to 14½ percent in the first nine months of 2012 while the system-wide capital adequacy ratio declined somewhat. BEM’s capital has dropped close to a critical level in September, requiring urgent action, and a few small banks’ large exposures have worsened their financial conditions. Nonetheless, the core of the banking sector remains well capitalized and liquid.
[...]
C. Financial Sector Policy
13. The mission urges the authorities to overcome delays with improving the transparency of the banking system. Adoption of the legal amendments seeking full transparency and disclosure of ultimate controllers in banks (delayed structural benchmark) is imperative in the face of emerging financial sector risks and recent non-transparent bank takeover attempts. In this context, the mission welcomes the authorities’ agreement to secure Parliamentary adoption of these legal amendments by end-2012 as a prior action, and to apply the new requirements to existing shareholders in the course of 2013-14 with a limited transition period.
14. The mission is deeply concerned over the precarious situation at BEM, which requires the authorities’ urgent and undivided attention. Over the past three years the bank has engaged in dubious lending practices notwithstanding repeated warnings by the NBM. Recent efforts to strengthen the bank’s performance have not brought meaningful results yet. Capital buffers continue to dwindle, the shareholders’ action plan is not fully adequate and its implementation has been slow, and the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) has not been sufficiently engaged in assessing the situation and its implications for the whole financial system. Against this background, the mission and the Government (representing the majority shareholder the state) agree that the following course of action is needed to facilitate the bank’s turnaround:
·         BEM’s action plan should be strengthened in the areas of raising profitability, selling foreclosed collateral, and collecting overdue loans. Decisive cost-cutting measures—including closure of unprofitable branches and staff optimization—should also be considered.
·         Line ministries should be tasked to work with the public enterprises under their control to resolve all nonperforming loans to BEM—either through repayment or transfer of collateral.
·         Members of the FSC should work closely with the bank to investigate the largest problem loans, especially those issued in the past three years, and facilitate their collection.
·         The FSC should meet on a regular basis to review progress with the implementation of these and other necessary measures.
In addition, the mission recommends that the Public Property Agency consider and approve, in line with applicable procedures, the BEM’s request for the sale-and-leaseback of tangible assets in compliance with Article 18 of Law No.121 and Articles 5 to 8 of Government Decision No.480. Opportunities for the sale-and-leaseback of BEM’s tangible assets should be actively explored by identifying and initiating contractual negotiations with leasing companies.
The mission also recommends that the NBM continue to monitor closely the financial condition of BEM as well as the implementation of the remedial measures imposed on the bank and the action plan adopted by BEM shareholders. It was agreed that the NBM will conduct an on-site audit of BEM based on end-2012 indicators and will communicate its results to IMF staff by mid-February 2013. Furthermore, by end-December 2012, the NBM plans to finalize a contingency plan to be applied in case of further worsening of the situation at the bank.
15. Alongside, the authorities and the mission agree that monitoring and mitigation of financial sector risks in other banks should be strengthened. In particular, on-site supervision should seek to ensure adequate provisioning in banks with rising NPLs and timely unwinding of large exposures to connected borrowers identified in NBM’s off-site analysis of banks’ portfolios. The NBM should closely monitor the sectoral and bank distribution of credit with the view of assessing whether pockets of vulnerability may be emerging. Among other actions:
·         The mission welcomes the NBM’s decision to abstain from raising the minimum capital adequacy ratio beyond 16 percent.
·         The mission recommends that the authorities move quickly to clarify and simplify the procedure for the use and sale of public property by joint stock companies, notably in the financial sector. To this end, we urge the authorities to develop and adopt legal amendments by end-February 2013 to remove the concept of “unused assets” under Law No.121 and Government Decision 480 to allow the sale or lease of any private property in the public domain, which is anticipated under the law, with a straightforward approval from the relevant authorized body. Other amendments to the Law on Joint Stock Companies, the Law on Financial Institutions and related Government decisions or regulations may be necessary to facilitate disposal of assets by financial companies, and will be developed in consultation with IMF staff by end-February 2013 as well.
[...]



Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Serbia – Central bank to hold “Monetura” monetary policy game tournament on 5 December


The National Bank of Serbia (Народна банка Србије) will be holding a tournament of the board game “Monetura” at its headquarters on 5 December 2012.  Anyone between the age of 15 and 30 is eligible to participate, and the winner of the tournament will be awarded a prize (yet to be specified).


“Monetura”, short for “Monetarna avantura” (monetary adventure), is a board game developed by the National Bank of Serbia in 2010.  In the game, players take on the monetary role of central bank governors, competing to arrive at the finish line by keeping their individual monetary systems balanced between inflation and deflation while moving forward and drawing cards that deal them inflationary or deflationary inputs.  The game was developed by the National Bank as part of its educational outreach program, and to date various tournaments have been held at schools and universities around Serbia.

The upcoming tournament will be held at 12:00 on Wednesday, 5 December 2012, in Hall 6 of the National Bank of Serbia headquarters at 12 Kralja Petra Street, Belgrade.  Participation is open to persons between 15 and 30 years of age, and proceedings will be in Serbian.

To apply, send name, date of birth, telephone number, e-mail address, and occupation/education by 12:00 on 3 December to Ms. Aleksandra Zdravković of the Belgrade Youth Office (Kancelarija za mlade Grada Beograda) at a.zdravkovic@beograd.gov.rs.  The first 20 qualified applicants will be accepted.  Although the tournament will begin with an explanation of the game, contestants are expected to familiarize themselves with the rules before their arrival.




Sources:
News article with photo of game board: Društvena igra Monetura: Turnir u NBS (2012-11-27)
Official site, with game rules: Друштвена игра "Монетура” (2012-06-21)
Tournament announcement and application instructions: Turnir u društvenoj igri "Monetura" (2012-11-26)


Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant


Romania – Central bank advisor states that foreign banks are not withdrawing capital from Romania but admits that banks overall are making fewer loans; ING Bank forecasts 0.5% GDP growth in Romania in 2013


On 28 November the newssite RomaniaLibera published remarks by an advisor to the governor of the national bank that were delivered at the “EU-Cofile 2012” banking symposium held at Sinaia over the last week.  Adrian Vasilescu, advisor to the governor of the National Bank of Romania (Banca Naţională a României - BNR), reassured the attendees at Sinaia that the national bank’s statistics indicate that foreign-owned banks are not transferring capital out of Romania to their Western parent banks, but he admitted that in Romania total loans to both individuals and businesses are in fact declining on a month-to-month basis.


In other news, ING Bank released an updated forecast for the Romanian economy in which it predicted a slight contraction of the economy in 4Q 2012 and annual GDP growth of 0.5% in 2013.



Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant


Serbia – Central bank reportedly planning to have banking sector set up an independent fund to deal with problem loans


On 27 November the newspaper “Novosti”, citing a professor of banking in Belgrade, revealed that the National Bank of Serbia (Народна банка Србије) is planning to have an independent fund be established to track and deal with problem loans in Serbia.  According to Assoc. Prof. Boško (Branko) Živanović of the Belgrade Banking Academy (Beogradska bankarska akademija), the National Bank wants the banks themselves to set up such a fund, since at present the low credit rating and the fiscal difficulties of the government itself make it infeasible for such a fund to be set up under public direction.

According to Prof. Živanović, the problem of non-performing loans in Serbia is far more serious than official statistics indicate.  Although the National Bank’s statistics indicate an overall rate of NPLs of 19.9%, he states that among loans to businesses the rate exceeds 25%, and in the agricultural sector it exceeds 50% for certain banks, while in the construction sector reliable figures are impossible to come by because many failing construction firms have been merged with other companies.  He judges that the banking system itself is in no danger because both capital adequacy (17%) and loss reserves (120%) are sufficient, but notes that the second tier of foreign-owned banks have worse problems with NPLs than do the state-owned banks because the excessive number of commercial banks present in the market has led to undue competition in expanding loan portfolios.

Source: Banke osnivaju fond za rizične (2012-11-27 21:03)


Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant

Ukraine – IMF publishes staff report on Ukraine


On 27 November the International Monetary Fund published a 96-page report entitled, “Ukraine: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation”.  Below are excerpts dealing with monetary policy and the banking system.  (Emphasis as per original.)


Context: Following the 2008/9 financial crisis and deep recession, a cyclical recovery took hold in Ukraine, supported by a stronger external environment. Efforts to consolidate public finances and repair the banking system began strengthening Ukraine’s resilience to external shocks. More recently, policies have not been sufficient to meet key objectives, and the government has hesitated to undertake politically unpopular reforms. The external environment has become less supportive, and the recovery is losing momentum.

[...]

10. Progress has been made on banking sector reforms, but bank balance sheets remain weak, and private credit growth is subdued. (Table 7; Figure 6; Annex III). Capital adequacy ratios are above the statutory minimum, thanks to two rounds of capital injections in 2009–10. But bank profitability is near zero as banks continue provisioning against bad loans. Nonperforming loans are around 15 percent of total loans (39 percent under broad definition of NPLs). Credit growth to the economy was only 6 percent in March, y-o-y, and credit as a percent of GDP has fallen from 79 percent in 2008 to 59 percent. Notwithstanding some de-dollarization, bank balance sheets remain exposed to currency movements due to regulatory distortions (the banking system has an overall fx short position of about US$8 billion) and fx (mostly in US$) loans to unhedged borrowers. External support for the banking system is shrinking. BIS figures show a 26 percent drop in foreign bank exposure to Ukraine during 2011. The loan-to-deposit ratio has fallen to a still high 160 percent, from a 2009 peak of 230 percent. Several important banking laws and reforms were completed during the past 18 months that will strengthen transparency (Ultimate Controllers law), banking supervision (Consolidated Supervision law; new provisioning regulations; migration to IFRS) and the resolution framework (Deposit Guarantee Fund law). Implementing regulations for these laws are being finalized. Nadra Bank (intervened in 2009) was privatized and recapitalized during 2011 with private funds, while resolution of the remaining state-intervened banks continues.

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Annex III. Financial Sector Developments and Challenges

This annex looks at the emergence of Ukraine’s banking crisis and the policy response and highlights some key near-term challenges facing the sector and policymakers, including: deleveraging, high nonperforming loans, currency mismatches, and withdrawal of longer term liquidity support granted during the crisis. It concludes with an assessment of banks’ relative financial soundness.

In the years leading up to the 2008/9 financial crisis, bank lending in Ukraine grew at a very rapid pace. Credit growth peaked in 2005–07 at an average of 70 percent per annum and the loan-to-GDP ratio surged to nearly 80 percent of GDP by end-2008.

The credit boom exacerbated vulnerabilities, many of which were discussed in the context of the 2008 FSAP (Box A1). Household and corporate sector debt grew rapidly, but banks’ risk management and lending standards, and supervisory oversight did not keep pace. Credit risks rose from real estate prices that surged well past levels in countries with comparable income levels and from currency mismatches on borrowers’ balance sheets from pervasive foreign-currency lending. Banks’ liquidity risk deepened as loan-to-deposit ratios approached 230 percent.

In late 2008, Ukraine was hit by a banking crisis. Weakened confidence in Ukraine’s policies and concerns about banks’ ability to roll over existing credit lines set off a deposit run that quickly developed into a full-blown banking crisis. As depositors fled (resulting in a 20 percent drop in the depositor base) they also abandoned the hryvnia, triggering a currency crisis. Bank lending froze (-2 percent nominal credit growth in 2009), NPLs rose rapidly, and bank profitability plummeted as banks increased their capital buffers and provisioned against loan losses.

The initial focus was on containing the crisis. The Fund (backed by a CIDA technical assistance grant) worked closely with the authorities and the World Bank, initially to stabilize the system through anti-crisis measures, and then on rehabilitation and strengthening banks and the institutional framework, and reducing vulnerabilities (Box A2). Two rounds of recapitalization have raised capital adequacy ratios to their current level of about 18 percent—well above the statutory minimum of 10 percent (Table 7)—thus providing some buffer against any further losses.

The focus has gradually shifted towards strengthening the legal and regulatory framework, and the contingency framework. Several important laws have been passed to strengthen supervision (consolidated supervision law), transparency (ultimate controllers law), and the resolution framework—implementing regulations for all three will be finalized during 2012.Under the revised resolution framework, responsibility for administering intervened banks has been shifted to the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which will allow the NBU to focus more squarely on its core mandate. The NBU is reviewing their emergency liquidity assistance and refinancing operation frameworks to allow longer maturities in some circumstances (while retaining strong collateral, solvency, and monitoring conditions, as needed). Given their experience in during the 2008/9 banking crisis, Ukraine could quickly re-activate other crisis response functions, if needed.

Despite progress made, Ukraine’s financial soundness indicators, and credit growth, remain comparatively weak. Ukraine is one of the more vulnerable countries with respect to NPL and loan-to-deposit positions (and spreads), and real credit growth has been negative.

Key challenges. There are a range of challenges inhibiting banks from reviving lending and providing a more supportive role for growth, including: risks of macroeconomic instability, a weak legal framework, lack of stable long-term funding, and still-weakened bank balance sheets. The focus here is on four specific near-term challenges: deleveraging, high NPLs, currency mismatches, and unwinding longterm liquidity support (stabilization loans).

Deleveraging. The foreign banking presence in Ukraine is smaller than in many peer countries (about 40 percent of Ukraine’s banking system is foreign owned; about 22 percent by euro area banks). Nonetheless, the drop in external funding has been significant, and has dampened banks’ capacity to lend (despite some increase in deposits). External debt of banks fell 35 percent between end-2008 to end-2011 to US$25 billion) and BIS figures indicate significant reductions in foreign claims on Ukraine. Bank balance sheets continue to grow (with loans to corporates increasing), but at a slower pace than nominal GDP (banks are relying relatively more on local deposits to reduce still-high loan-to-deposit ratios). Overall nominal credit growth is in single digits (fx-denominated loans continue to fall, driven by the ban on fx loans to unhedged borrowers, which has contributed to an overall drop in retail loans). Deleveraging is expected to continue to weigh on bank balance sheets, with foreign financing to Ukraine’s banking system is expected to continue to fall. The NBU has expressed interest in participating in Vienna 2.0, which could provide a platform for mitigating deleveraging pressures, and better cross-border coordination.

Reducing NPLs. The crisis pushed NPLs and loan loss provisions (LLPs) into a steep upward trend. By end-April 2012, NPLs (doubtful and loss items) appeared to have stabilized at around 15 percent of total loans (or around 40 percent if including “substandard” loans). A comparison against past crisis cases suggests Ukraine is lagging in terms of bringing down NPL levels at this stage of the post-crisis cycle (though contemporaneously better than some peers). NPLs are concentrated among enterprises, though household mortgages have also contributed. These high levels of NPLs are weighing heavily on bank balance sheets and profitability, and the lack of incentives to write-off loans could be dampening full realization of the extent of bad loans (some analysts have noted that current levels of LLPs may be insufficient). The NBU and the Government have taken some measures to help cleanse NPLs from the banks’ balance sheets by providing tax relief for loss provisions and write-offs, the latter of which totaled to UAH 33 billion (about 4 percent of loans) during the past 16 months. A new regulation bringing asset classification and loan loss provisioning rules closer to international best practices was approved, but further tax, legal, and regulatory measures are needed. Where banks report high ratios of restructured loans (or other risk factors), independent assessments may be useful. Other steps should include further strengthening of creditors’ rights, and tax measures to facilitate write-offs (e.g., clarify tax consequences of writing off fully provisioned loans, establishing fair value of NPL sales for tax purposes, tax treatment of accrued but unpaid (suspended) interest on overdue loans, and VAT on resale of repossessed collateral).

Reducing currency mismatches. In early 2009, the NBU redefined (via ‘Resolution 109’) the coverage of banks’ net open fx positions by instructing banks to exclude fx LLPs against fx loans from the calculation. This created a sudden increase of long (or a decrease of short) fx positions that compelled the banks to sell fx in the market against UAH. The overall short position of the banking system (from an economic perspective) is currently estimated at about US$8 billion, or about 6 percent of system assets. This leaves banks exposed to movements in the exchange rate, with implications for capital adequacy through devaluation losses and possible increases in NPLs and provisioning (banks remain exposed to exchange rate movements from fx lending to unhedged borrowers). The NBU is moving forward with a pilot program for unwinding this policy that has included the parallel sale of government fx-indexed bonds. The impact on the exchange rate or fx reserves (and bank liquidity) from unwinding this resolution is an important consideration, though the magnitude is contingent on the mix of adjustment chosen by banks. Overall, stress tests suggest that existing banking system capital buffers could absorb a modest exchange rate depreciation, though some individual banks could require additional capital.

Unwinding Longer Term Liquidity Support (Stabilization Loans). The stock of stabilization loans has fallen from a peak of about UAH85 billion shortly after the onset of the crisis, to around UAH60 billion. These loans are scheduled to be paid down in roughly equally distributed amounts over the next four years, though some of these loans may be only partially recoverable (e.g., those to state-intervened banks). These repayments, combined with liquidity needs from unwinding Resolution 109 (and deleveraging), present liquidity management challenges for banks and the NBU. It is likely that the NBU will need to provide liquidity support, to banks determined to be solvent, in the context of unwinding these crisis era policies and as term external funding is withdrawn. In this context, the authorities are reviewing their refinancing window, with an eye towards extending maturities out towards 365 days, and are considering some smoothing payments of stabilization loans under strengthened collateral conditions.

Assessment of Ukrainian Banks’ Financial Soundness. To assess the health of the banking system, staff compiled a financial soundness indicators (FSI) index using bank-by-bank data. The results suggest that while the large majority of banks currently have adequate indicators, there is a need for close monitoring and assessment of some banks. Such indicators (with established thresholds that could trigger supervisory actions) provide useful ‘early warning indicators’ for bank monitoring purposes.



Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant