Friday, February 28, 2014

Currencies & Interest Rates – Devaluation in Kazakhstan leads to public protests; Bank runs begin after unknown parties send SMS and WhatsApp messages warning that several banks are close to failure; Kaspi Bank offers reward of KZT 100 mln for information on identity of “SMS terrorist”; Looser monetary policy in Macedonia fails to spur lending growth; People’s Bank of China announces interest rate ceilings on “small” foreign-currency deposits to be eliminated beginning in Shanghai Free Trade Zone on 1 March 2014; Rapid increase in use of Chinese yuan internationally; Explosive growth of CNY deposits in Taiwan


On 11 February 2014 the National Bank of Kazakhstan (Қазақстан Республикасы Ұлттық Банкінің) published an untitled press release – issued only in Kazakh and Russian, not in English – to announce that it would be reducing its target exchange rate for the Kazakh tenge (KZT) from 155.50 per USD to 184.50 per USD.  The nondescript 3-page announcement effectively devalued the nation’s currency by 19% overnight, wiping out 19% of the monetary value of any savings and pension deposits made in tenge rather than foreign currencies. 

The move sparked protests in Astana, Almaty, and elsewhere.  In addition, within hours rumors began circulating on social networks and via SMS and WhatsApp that several banks were on the verge of failure, especially the mid-sized banks Bank CenterCredit («Банк ЦентрКредит » АҚ), Alliance Bank («Альянс Банк» АҚ), and Kaspi Bank («Kaspi Bank» АҚ).  These and other banks were soon inundated with panicked depositors seeking to withdraw their funds, but none of the banks encountered any serious difficulties.

On 11 February the CEO of Bank CenterCredit published a press release denying that the devaluation would have any negative impact on the bank, and noting that among the bank’s shareholders are Korea’s KB Kookmin Bank (KB국민은행), which has more than USD 250 billion in total assets, and International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group.

On 18 February the three banks Bank CenterCredit, Alliance Bank, and Kaspi Bank issued a joint press release, noting that since the devaluation SMS and WhatsApp messages had been sent to a large number of people, particularly in Almaty and Astana, claiming that the three banks were on the verge of bankruptcy and having their licenses revoked.  The press release included images of two offending SMSs, and called on law enforcement authorities to catch and prosecute those guilty of the attacks.

Also on 18 February, the CEO of one of the banks affected, Kaspi Bank, announced a reward of KZT 100 million (USD 540,000) for information leading to the identification of the person sending the SMSs.  (But at least one legal expert was quoted as saying that even if the banks did succeed in finding any of the perpetrators, it would be difficult to prosecute them.)  The bank also announced that it would be raising the salaries of its employees by 10% to compensate in part for the devaluation.

On 25 February, the consumer-rights organization KazPotrebNadzor suggested that one trillion tenge (USD 5.4 bln) from the nation’s sovereign wealth fund, the Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund («Самұрық-Қазына» Ұлттық әл-ауқат қоры» АҚ), be used to compensate low-income Kazakh citizens who suffered from the devaluation.  The organization suggested that the monies be used 1) to reimburse the losses of pension depositors in the United National Pension Fund («Бірыңғай жинақтаушы зейнетақы қорын» АҚ) whose pension deposits did not exceed KZT 3 mln at the time of the devaluation, 2) to reimburse 50% of the losses of holders of KZT-denominated bank accounts not exceeding KZT 3 mln at the time of the devaluation, and 3) in subsidies for utility payments for able-bodied citizens who do not have a regular income.

Sources:
National Bank of Kazakhstan press release – Russian version: ПРЕСС-РЕЛИЗ № 5 (2014-02-11 11:22:17)


On 26 February the International Monetary Fund published a country report for Macedonia.  Among other items, the report noted that a slight reduction in policy interest rates decided upon by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia (Народна банка на Република Македонија) on 9 July 2013 had not resulted in the hoped-for increase in lending, “partly due to risk aversion, partly to portfolio cleansing”:


RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

[...]

5. Further monetary easing has been unable to revive credit growth. In the face of a deceleration in credit growth to about 3.1 percent in the first half of the year, in July the authorities reduced the central bank bill rate (the main policy instrument) and the 7-day deposit facility rate by 25 basis points, to 3.25 percent and 1.50 percent, respectively. At the same time, they lowered reserve requirements on liabilities in domestic currency, tightening them on short-term FX deposits, with the dual objectives of stimulating deposit growth in local currency and encouraging long-term foreign capital funding of domestic banks. Yet credit growth has remained subdued so far, especially to the corporate sector—partly due to risk aversion, partly to portfolio cleaning.

[...]

Sources:
National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia rate decision: Соопштение на НБРМ (2013-07-10)


In interest-rate news, on 27 February 2014 the Shanghai office of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) announced that as a first step toward complete marketization of interest rates on foreign-currency deposits nationwide, beginning on 1 March the nationally-mandated ceilings on interest rates on “small” foreign-currency deposits would be eliminated within the Shanghai Free Trade Zone.

A PBC directive of 25 August 2000 defined “small” (小额) foreign-currency deposits as deposits of less than USD 3 million or equivalent.

The Shanghai Free Trade Zone – formally known as the “China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone” (中国(上海)自由贸易试验区) – was officially opened on 29 September 2013.

Sources:
Removal of interest-rate ceiling on “small” foreign-currency deposits: 上海自贸区放开小额外币存款利率上限 (2014-02-27 00:07:00)
PBC directive defining threshold for large and small foreign-currency deposits: 200014 关于改革外币存贷款利率管理体制的通知银发[2000]267 (2000-08-25)
Homepage of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone: 中国(上海)自由贸易试验区门户网站


Also in China, on 18 February the commercial bank Bank of China (中国银行, not to be confused with the nation’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China) issued a quarterly update to its Cross-Border RMB Index (CRI).  The index, which was launched on 20 September 2013, aims to be a comprehensive measure of the use of RMB (renminbi 人民币 – CNY) “for cross-border and offshore transactions by both domestic and overseas clients.”

With the end of 2011 being set as 100, the index at the end of 2013 reached a level of 228, an increase of 128% over two years and of 56% in 2013 alone, indicating rapid growth in the use of CNY not only in Chinese imports and exports, but also between parties located outside China.  The bank’s press release noted as well that the increased use of CNY internationally is also revealed by data from BIS and SWIFT: “According to the market survey result released by the Bank for International Settlements, RMB has become the ninth biggest foreign exchange currency. The data disclosed by SWIFT also shows that RMB has become the eighth biggest currency for international settlement.”

Although the mechanics behind the calculation of each quarter’s result have not been published, in its initial press release on 20 September 2013 the bank offered the following explanation of how the new index would work (emphasis added):

Characteristics of the Index:

Unique perspective. The market generally creates indices from the perspective of currency functions, while CRI creates indices from the perspective of currency circulation process, so as to reveal the dynamic circulation and utilization of RMB from a different perspective.

Well-knit framework. The index is composed of three well-knit parts including cross-border outflow, overseas circulation and cross-border inflow of RMB, which are all reflected by the flow indicators so that the index framework is logically consistent.

Full coverage. The index with wide coverage, covers all items under current account and typical items under capital account, reflecting RMB circulation and utilization abroad by clearing status, which comprehensively reveals the degree of activity of cross-border and overseas RMB circulation and utilization.

Clear guideline. Changes in cross-border RMB index can be divided by various composition indicators of cross-border outflow, circulation and inflow for better understanding of the influences of changes in RMB utilization in commodity trade, service trade, direct investment, overseas clearing and other items on index performance, providing a clear guideline for improving cross-border RMB utilization.


Sources:
Launching of index – Chinese: 中国银行有关负责人就跨境人民币指数答记者问 (2013-09-20)
Launching of index – English: Bank of China Officially Launches Cross-Border RMB Index (2013-09-20)


Finally, on 14 February the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) published statistics for RMB (CNY) deposits in Taiwan as of the end of January 2014.  The figures reveal that at the end of January total CNY-denominated deposits in Taiwan had reached CNY 214.522 billion (USD 35.4 bln).

Deposits in CNY only became possible in Taiwan one year earlier, on 6 February 2013, and within one day a total of CNY 1.3 bln of deposits were created.  The strong interest in CNY-denominated deposits in Taiwan is thought to be due to the higher interest rates offered by Taiwanese for CNY deposits than for Taiwan dollar (TWD) deposits.

Sources:
Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan) press release on stats for January 2014: 新聞發布第035(1031月銀行辦理人民幣業務概況) (2014-02-14)
Taiwanese news article: 1月底 人民幣存款2145.22 (2014-02-14 16:45)
Mainland Chinese news article: 台湾岛内人民币存款折合新台币逾兆 开办仅1 (2014-02-15 10:28:00)
Central Bank of Republic of China (Taiwan) press release on beginning of CNY accounts: 新聞發布第035(人民幣業務及外幣結算平台之相關進展) (2013-02-07)


Friday, February 21, 2014

Week 8 of 2014 – Giveaway info for the week – Azerbaijan: Bank offering 7.50% for 12-month retail deposits in USD, 4.00% for retail deposits in EUR, 4.00% for commercial deposits in USD

As a free sample for clients and potential clients, below is offered summary information on a sample bank in Eastern Europe or Central Asia selected casually from among those offering moderate (not particularly high) interest rates for foreign-currency retail term deposits.  (This bank’s interest rate of 7.50% for 12-month accounts in USD is in fact among the lowest being offered by any bank in Azerbaijan, where interest rates for USD range as high as 14.00%.)




Bank info:

Bank:  Kapital Bank OJSC (“Kapital Bank” Açıq Səhmdar Cəmiyyəti)
Headquarters:  Baku (Bakı), Azerbaijan
Founded:  In 2000 through a merger of three state-owned banks, the oldest of which was founded in 1874-
Total assets:  AZN 1.0486 bln (USD 1.337 bln) as of 31 Dec. 2013
Number of branches: 100 as of 1 Oct. 2013
No. of ATMs:  477 as of 1 Oct. 2013
No. of credit and debit cards in circulation:  2,049,387 as of 1 Oct. 2013
Ownership structure:  Owned 99.84% by PASHA Holding (Paşa Holdinq)
Quarterly financial statements and ratios for most recent quarter:  Bank haqqında
Quarterly financial statements, 2010-2013:  Maliyyə göstəriciləri (incomplete)
Annual reports, 2003-2012:  İllik hesabatlar
Auditor: Ernst & Young Holdings (CIS) B.V. (Ernst & Yanq Holdinqs (SiAyEs) Bi.Vi.)
SWIFT Code:  AIIBAZ2X
Ratings:
Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR): B+
Long-term local-currency and foreign-currency deposit ratings: B1
Short-term local-currency and foreign-currency deposit ratings: Not Prime
Standalone bank financial-strength rating: E+
Contact info:
Phone:  (+994) 12-493-6630
Fax:  (+994) 12-493-7905
E-mail:  office@kapitalbank.az
Web:  www.kapitalbank.az



Terms of retail term deposit “VIP Deposit” ("VİP" Depoziti):
USD (minimum USD 1,000):  7.50% a.p.r. for 12 months, 8.50% for 24 mos., 9.50% for 36 mos.
EUR (minimum EUR 1,000):  4.00% a.p.r. for 12 months, 5.00% for 24 mos., 6.00% for 36 mos.
AZN (minimum AZN 1,000):  7.50% a.p.r. for 12 months, 8.50% for 24 mos., 9.50% for 36 mos.


USD &AZN:  4.00% a.p.r. for 12 months, 5.00% for 24 mos., 6.00% for 36 mos.


Cyprus – IMF Mission Chief for Cyprus, Delia Valculescu, confirms IMF’s support for saddling former depositors of Laiki Bank with EUR 9 bln of ECB’s bad debts from Bank of Cyprus, denies it is unjust, claims ELA secretly lent to Laiki Bank was simply liquidity, not capital




On 18 February 2014 the International Monetary Fund published the text of a conference call held on 11 February concerning Cyprus.  One questioner attempted in vain to obtain a clear answer on whether the IMF considers it fair or just that the €9 billion in emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) secretly loaned to Laiki Bank in late 2012 has been made into a liability of former Laiki Bank depositors.  (Emphasis added in yellow.)

Transcript of a Conference Call on Cyprus
Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
SPEAKERS:
Delia Velculescu, Mission Chief for Cyprus
Ángela Gaviria, Communications Department

[...]
QUESTIONER: Two questions if I may. Could you elaborate on how you interpret this better than expected performance? Your original forecast for 2013, as you said, was worse than what we've seen, but the private sector was expecting far worse. So if you could just give us a little bit more detail, why do you think Cyprus has done better than what's expected?
The second question, with regards to Bank of Cyprus, is: could you tell us what the IMF's position is with regards to how ELA funding from the European Central Bank should be treated? Some shareholders have expressed concern about Laiki's ELA burden being transferred to Bank of Cyprus. Do you agree that this should be the case or do you think it should be treated differently?
MS. VELCULESCU: Let me respond to your first question, and I may need some clarification on your second question. At the time of our initial growth projections for the program, when we estimated negative growth of close to 9 percent last year, we were faced with incredible uncertainty about how consumers and how the economy would behave in the face of a very large shock. That shock was unprecedented, and there weren't any benchmarks to use at the time.
We had made our best assumptions looking at a variety of factors, including the capital restrictions that were imposed, the possible effect of the bail-in on domestic participants and their wealth perception, and the fiscal adjustment that was going to take place through the economy, and we came up with our estimate.
Fortunately, our estimate turned out to be too conservative. That is a positive factor. What has transpired looking at the data ex post is that indeed demand has held out better than expected. That's largely due to private sector consumption, which reacted relatively less negatively to the initial shock than we had expected, in large part due to consumption smoothing. On the supply side we have also seen more resilience of both the service sector, which is a key growth driver for this economy, and tourism.
On the second question, can you repeat or clarify what you asked?
QUESTIONER: Right. Since the program was implemented some people have been insisting that Bank of Cyprus should not take on the 9.6 billion euro ELA burden from Laiki Bank, and this has been a concern that has been voiced by former depositors, now shareholders, and others consistently since last spring. So I'm wondering what the IMF's position is with regards to burdening Bank of Cyprus with Laiki's ELA exposure?
MS. VELCULESCU: As you know, Cyprus is under a program financed both by the IMF and by the European Stability Mechanism. It is also a member of the Eurozone, and the Central Bank of Cyprus is a member of the Eurosystem. So within that context, ELA is a liability of individual banks, but also ultimately of the Central Bank of Cyprus toward the Eurosystem. This is an important consideration that one needs to take into account when looking at how the resolution of the two large banks was done at the time.
QUESTIONER: But do you think that's a good idea? Do you think it's fair? Do you think it's fair to shareholders that they've had their deposits turned into equity in a bank they didn't necessarily want to own, but the ELA liability remains intact in a new, healthy bank weighing it down, which surely will affect how this bank fares in the asset quality review and the other tests to go through?
MS. VELCULESCU: There are two separate issues there. One is the ELA itself, and that has to do with the capacity of the bank to have access to liquidity. The other one is regarding the deposit to equity conversion. This bank clearly needed capital. It had borrowed beyond its means, and it had made imprudent decisions as well. The bail in necessary to replenish its capital was not related to the ELA.
[...]

Source:
International Monetary Fund: Transcript of a Conference Call on Cyprus (2014-02-18)

Considering that Ms. Velculescu, IMF Mission Chief for Cyprus since May 2012, has been the Troika’s point person for Cyprus since the beginning of Cyprus’ difficulties, her ignorance of the realities of the banking situation – if not feigned – is breathtaking.  Indeed,

-       Is it true that the “emergency liquidity assistance” (ELA) merely had to do with “the capacity of the bank to have access to liquidity”?
-       Is it true that a “bail in” was necessary to replenish the bank’s capital, and if so then why did the Troika go out of its way to limit this bail-in to only certain customers?
-       Is it true that the bail-in “was not related to the ELA”?

Let us take a brief look at how the Cyprus crisis developed, recalling along the way some of the many moments when the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC), the Cypriot government, the European Central Bank (EBC), and/or the IMF exerted themselves – often in collusion together – to keep ordinary depositors in the dark about the true risks facing their deposits, and about the massacre that was being prepared for them behind the scenes.

Note: In recent years the official name of the bank has oscillated between “Marfin Popular Bank” and “Cyprus Popular Bank”.  (This particular bank has chosen to have its official name registered in English rather than in Greek.)  But throughout this period it has been referred to colloquially in Greek as “Laiki Bank”, since “laiki” (λαϊκή) is the Greek translation of the English word “popular”.


Chronology

Let us begin with some background from a prospectus that Laiki Bank issued on 19 May 2011 (emphasis added):


Marfin Popular Bank Group offers a comprehensive range of banking, insurance and related financial services. The Group also offers insurance services through a related company. It operates in Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom, Australia, Guernsey, Serbia, Romania, the Ukraine, Estonia, Malta and Russia.

The Group is primarily based in Cyprus, where it holds a 18.77% market share in deposits and a 17.00% market share in loans (Source: Group Data, Central Bank of Cyprus (December 2010, including cooperative banking institutions and International Business Units (IBUs)). The main part of the Group's business is currently undertaken in the Greek market, in which the Group is active since 1992.

The Bank commenced its operations in 1901, upon establishment of the Popular Savings Bank of Limassol. The Savings Bank grew into a full Banking Institution and was registered as the first public company in 1924, with registration number 1, under the name Popular Bank of Limassol Ltd. In 1967, the Bank was renamed Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd, and has been rapidly expanding its business throughout Cyprus since 1969. On May 26, 2004, it was renamed Cyprus Popular Bank Public Company Ltd., in accordance with the provisions of the Cyprus Company Law, Chap. 113. Finally, on October 31, 2006, the Extraordinary General Shareholders’ Meeting approved the change of the name of the Bank to Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd.


The prospectus helps us with some useful chronological data:

2006:
§ Merger with the Greek financial groups “Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A.” (“MIG”) (formerly, “Marfin Financial Group”) and “Egnatia Bank S.A.”, and a decision to acquire 100% of the share capital of “Laiki Bank (Hellas) S.A.”.
§ The Bank is renamed to “Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd” (“MPB”).

2009:
§ The Boards of the Bank and its subsidiary “Marfin Egnatia Bank S.A.” approved to commence the procedures for the merger of the two banks.

2010:
§ According to Articles 201(xvii) and 201(xix) of (Cyprus) Companies Law, the joint request of the Bank and Marfin Egnatia Bank SA regarding the approval of the completion of the merger was examined by the District Court of Nicosia which issued a decision setting 31.03.2011 (at 12.00 pm) as the date of effect of the merger.

2011:
§ Completion of the cross-border merger of Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd with Marfin Egnatia Bank S.A.. From the date of effect of the merger (1 April 2011) Marfin Egnatia Bank operates as a Branch of the Bank in Greece.

As indicated in an earlier article in this column, the 2011 merger of Marfin Egnatia Bank in Greece with (into) Marfin Popular Bank in Cyprus, and the subsequent conversion of Marfin Egnatia from a subsidiary into a branch of the Cypriot parent, resulted in the transfer of one or two billion euros worth of liabilities (bad loans and bonds) from the Greek banking system to the Cypriot banking system.  European Commission directive 2005/56/EC (the “Mergers Directive”) gave the Central Bank of Cyprus no voice in permitting or blocking the merger, and for the subsequent conversion of the Greek bank from a subsidiary into a branch the CBC had only the choice of accepting it or forcing the Greek bank to cease operations.

Sources:


[To be continued]

Friday, February 14, 2014

Week 7 of 2014 – Giveaway info for the week – Russia: Bank offering 4.50% for 367-day retail deposits of USD/EUR 300 or more

As a free sample for clients and potential clients, below is offered summary information on a sample bank in Eastern Europe or Central Asia selected casually from among those offering moderate (not particularly high) interest rates for foreign-currency retail term deposits.  This bank’s interest rate of 4.50% for 12-month accounts in USD is currently in 120th place among interest rates for 12-month USD retail accounts in Russia, with the highest-ranking account being at a bank that offers 6.51% for USD 1,000 or more.




Bank info:

Bank:  Bank Narodniy Credit (OJSC Bank “Narodniy Credit” – ОАО Банк «Народный кредит»)
Headquarters:  Moscow, Russian Federation
Founded:  1993
Total assets:  RUB 41.51 bln (USD 1.27 bln) as of 31 Dec. 2013 (107th largest in Russia)
Number of branches and offices: 53
No. of ATMs:  122
Ownership structure as of 1 Jan. 2014: Информация о лицах (list and diagram)
Quarterly financial statements, 2005-2013:  Отчетность
Monthly/quarterly financial statements, 2007-2014; annual financial statements, 1997-2012:  Открытое акционерное общество Банк "Народный кредит"
Quarterly/annual financial statements, 2010-2012; other public disclosures: ОАО Банк "Народный кредит"
Auditor: OOO Auditing Service RTsB-Delovaya Perspektiva (ООО «Консультационно-аудиторская фирма «Деловая Перспектива»)
SWIFT Code: NACRRUMM
Ratings:
Rating agency “Expert RA” (Эксперт РА): credit rating of “A” (sublevel III), with outlook of “developing”
Rating agency “RA-National” («Национальное Рейтинговое Агентство»): credit rating of “A”
Recent awards:  In the “Financial Olympics”, an event hosted annually at the Moscow Ritz-Carlton Hotel by the rating agency RBK Rating, the bank received on 30 May 2011 the award “Deposit Bank (Potential and Prospects” for 2010.  (News storyPhoto.)
Contact info:
Phone:  (+7) 495-739-54-78
Fax:  (+7) 499-967-82-87
E-mail:  info@narcred.ru
Web:  www.narcred.ru


Terms of retail term deposit “Narodniy Percentage” («Народный процент»):
USD or EUR (minimum deposit USD/EUR 300):  0.75% a.p.r. for 31 days, 2.00% for 91 days, 3.50% for 181 days, 4.50% for 367 days.
RUB (minimum deposit RUB 5,000):  6.25% a.p.r. for 31 days, 8.25% for 91 days, 9.25% for 181 days, 10.25% for 367 days.


The bank calculates interest rates for commercial deposits on a case-by-case basis depending on currency, amount, and maturity of deposit.


Thursday, February 13, 2014

Czech Rep. – Central bank researchers publish a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work, revealing who are the winners and losers in open-market operations



On 31 January 2014 the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka – CNB) published online a research paper regarding monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic.  The paper, submitted in October 2013 and published on 31 January in the central bank’s series of Research and Policy Notes, was written by six researchers at the Czech National Bank and one Czech consultant in Washington, DC.

The abstract of the paper reads as follows:


What We Know About Monetary Policy Transmission in the Czech Republic: Collection of Empirical Results


Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Michal Franta, Dana Hájková, Petr Král, Ivana Kubicová, Anca Podpiera, Branislav Saxa

This paper concentrates on describing the available empirical findings on monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic. Besides the overall impact of monetary policy on inflation and output, it is useful to study its individual channels, in particular the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, and the wealth channel. The results confirm that the transmission of monetary impulses to the real economy works in an intuitive direction and to an intuitive extent. Our analyses show, however, that the global financial and economic crisis might have somewhat slowed and weakened the transmission. We found an indication of such a change in the functioning of the interest rate channel, where elevated risk premiums played a major role.

JEL [Journal of Economic Literature classification] codes: C11, C32, E44, E52, E58

Keywords: Bayesian, monetary policy transmission, time-varying parameters, VAR [vector autoregression] model


Although the paper is not entirely concerned with interest rates, it nevertheless contains a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work.  The explanation is reproduced in full below:


2. Setting the Stage: Stylized Description of Monetary Policy Transmission and Empirical Literature Review

2.1 Stylized description of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation

The basic scheme of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation is depicted in Chart 2.1.1. Therefore, we focus on conventional monetary policy in this description and abstract from various unconventional measures. The primary transmission channels include the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the credit channel, and the asset price channel. The importance of particular channels in a particular economy depends on the openness of the economy, its financial system development, as well as the role of the banking sector. Other channels of monetary policy transmission include the expectations channel and the risk-taking channel.

Through the interest rate channel, monetary policy influences the real economy by changing key interest rates. As consumption, saving, and investment decisions are typically based on long-term interest rates, the first necessary condition for effective monetary policy is a functioning channel of transmission of monetary policy interest rates to financial market interest rates.2 The changes in financial market interest rates influence the costs of interbank borrowing, to which banks subsequently react by adjusting their deposit interest rates (the alternative bank financing cost). At the same time, the changes in the cost of bank financing influence the interest rates on loans provided by banks. In the end, client interest rates on deposits and loans enter the optimization process of economic agents in terms of intertemporal substitution or valuation of economic projects.

2 This transmission typically works due to the no-arbitrage relationship between these two types of interest rates. The elevation of spreads between monetary policy interest rates and financial market interest rates during the global financial crisis was in contradiction with this assumption. This paper abstracts from this issue.

The existence of imperfect information and substitution between financial assets in bank-based economic systems cause the transmission of interest rate changes to be inhomogeneous across economic agents (credit channel).3 The heterogeneity of effects on firms is caused mainly by the availability and value of collateral, and is reflected in the availability and conditions of loans (financial accelerator, balance-sheet channel); firms with worse financial positions are affected by a monetary policy tightening more than firms with good financial positions. In the case of banks, the credit channel is linked to agency costs and the strength of bank balance sheets, which determine the external premium of bank financing and banks’ access to external sources and influence the changes in the credit supply after monetary policy changes.

3 For the purposes of this publication, the existence of the credit channel in the Czech Republic was analyzed using the methodology of Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) using monthly data for 2004–2009. However, the results do not appear to be robust enough, therefore credit channel analysis is not included in the following text.

The effect of the exchange rate on inflation is especially substantial for very open economies. An exchange rate shock has a direct effect on consumer inflation through prices of imported consumer goods. Indirect effects include the price effects of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, changes in the domestic prices of raw materials and intermediate goods, and changes in the monetary policy stance.

Figure 2.1.1: Primary Transmission Channels Between Change in Key Monetary Policy Interest Rates and Inflation


The asset price channel can cause asset price adjustments induced by interest rate changes to influence the value of households’ and firms’ balance sheets, which is reflected in their confidence in the economy. The effectiveness of this channel for households is conditional on their perceptions about whether growth in real estate prices and financial asset prices increases wealth and is a source of consumption spending. In the case of firms, growth in a firm’s stock market value makes investment capital relatively cheaper (Tobin’s Q).


Because the authors are economists, they naturally overlook in the figure above (but do not overlook entirely in the text of the paper) what is perhaps the most crucial link in the entire chain.  Between “INTEREST RATE CUT” and “Decrease in market interest rate” there should be inserted a step entitled “Flooding of market with low-interest liquidity via open-market operations”.

Indeed if the central bank did not enter into competition with savers by temporarily (in the case of a repo) creating money out of nowhere and lending it at below-market interest rates to financial institutions, then financial institutions would be forced to obtain these necessary funds by turning to savers and offering them attractive interest rates on deposits.  Open market operations are, by their very nature, anti-market operations, intended to de-level the supply/demand playing field and give one side an advantage.  If, conversely, the central bank were to give preference to depositors instead of banks, such as by bypassing banks and soliciting deposits directly from savers and paying them 20% a.p.r. interest, then it would be the banks that would suffer and the savers who would win.  (This latter strategy, to all appearances, has yet to show up in the “monetary policy toolbox” of a central bank anywhere in the world.)

The figure shown above indicates that the central bank’s cutting of its “policy interest rate” in the end leads – via the open-market operations that are omitted in the figure – to inflation.  That is, overall there will be no net enrichment of the nation’s economy.  But there will be an enrichment of some “economic agents” at the expense of others, and the figure makes it evident who these will be:

  1. In the exchange rate channel, the early gainers will be those who are holding significant amounts of foreign currencies, at the expense of those who are holding significant amounts of the currency that the central bank intervenes in (in this case the Czech koruna, or CZK).

  1. In the interest rate and credit channels, the early gainers will be those who have large debts, at the expense of those who have little or no debts (savers or those who consider it a virtue to live within their means).  In addition, lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios for banks will cut the losses and improve the capital adequacy of banks holding large quantities of NPLs, a gift to those who are shareholders of the more riskily run banks at the expense of those who do not own stock in risky banks.

  1. In the asset price channel, the early gainers will be those who own assets (real estate, stocks, motor yachts, etc.), at the expense of those who do not own assets, such as the poor or those who have placed their accumulated wealth in a bank in the form of savings.

In short, the authors make it clear that central-bank suppression of interest rates, carried out through temporary open-market operations (repos), leads in the end to inflation for everyone, but in the meantime is an effective means to transfer wealth from the poor and savers (especially savers who deposited their money in the domestic currency) to those who have gambled with high leverage (debt), who hold large amounts of cash in foreign currencies, who own stock in banks, or who own assets.


Sources:
Database of CNB open-market operations, day by day: History of CNB open market operations - OMO



Thursday, February 6, 2014

Week 6 of 2014 – Giveaway info for the week – Moldova: Bank offering USD/EUR 4.7% retail, 4.0% commercial for 12-month deposits of USD/EUR 100 or more

As a free sample for clients and potential clients, below is offered summary information on a randomly-chosen bank in Eastern Europe or Central Asia offering moderate (not particularly high) interest rates for foreign-currency retail term deposits:




Bank info:

Bank:  Moldindconbank S.A.
Headquarters:  Chişinău, Moldova (situated between Ukraine and Romania)
Founded:  1959
Total assets:  MDL* 12.82 bln (USD 981.93 mln) as of 31 Dec. 2013
   *MDL = Moldovan leu.  As of 31 Dec. 2013, USD 1 = MDL 13.0570
Total new foreign-currency deposits accepted in 4Q 2013:  equivalent to MDL 146.65 mln (USD 11.23 mln)
No. of branches and agencies:  112
No. of ATMs:  127
No. of employees:  1,063 as of 31 Dec. 2013
Recent awards:  “Bank of the Year” for 2013 in the category “Efficiency and stability” as awarded by Teleradio-Moldova
Contact info:
Phone: (+373) 22 57-67-82
Fax: (+373) 22 27-91-95
E-mail: info@micb.md
Web: www.moldindconbank.com/


USD or EUR (minimum deposit USD/EUR 100): fixed rates of 1.0% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 4.0% for 6 mos., 4.7% for 12 mos.
MDL (minimum deposit MDL 1,000): fixed rates of 2.00% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 5.25% for 6 mos., 6.75% for 12 mos.


USD or EUR (minimum deposit USD/EUR 100): floating rates of 0.0% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 3.0% for 6 mos., 4.0% for 12 mos.
MDL (minimum deposit MDL 1,000): floating rates of 2.00% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 6.50% for 6 mos., 7.50% for 12 mos.