Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Bosnia – Balkan Investment Bank placed under a temporary administrator after recapitalization; Central bank creates Twitter account; Deadline for sale of SEE subsidiaries of Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank extended to mid-2015; IMF publishes staff report on Bosnia, urging both of the major entities to give tax breaks to encourage loan loss provisioning


On 12 July 2013 it became known that the Lithuanian-controlled commercial bank Balkan Investment Bank (BIB) had been placed under the control of a temporary administrator by the Banking Agency of Republika Srpska (Агенција за банкарство Републике Српске – ABRS).  On that date the bank filed a public form indicating that on 8 July the bank had notified the court registrar that the CEO of the bank, the Lithuanian citizen Edvinas Navickas, had been suspended from his position and in his place Dejan Radmanović (Дејан Радмановић) had been appointed to head the bank as temporary administrator.

In a statement made to the news agency SRNA, also published on 12 July, the director of the Banking Agency, Ms. Slavica Injac (Славица Ињац) indicated that the Agency had not placed BIB under the full regime of a traditional “temporary administration” (привремена управа), but had merely appointed one individual as a “temporary administrator” (привремени управник).  There was no need for a traditional temporary administration, she said, because the bank was both liquid and solvent, but the appointment of a new individual to head the bank was carried out in order to safeguard the interests “of shareholders and of the depositary bank” following on the recapitalization of the bank carried out by the Republic of Srpska Investment-Development Bank (Инвестиционо-развојна банка Републике Српске) and the Guarantee Fund of Republika Srpska (Гарантни фонд Републике Српске).  (The latter is not to be confused with Bosnia’s deposit insurance fund, the Deposit Insurance Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Агенција за осигурање депозита Босне и Херцеговине), of which BIB has been a member since 1 May 2004.)

Radmanović had previously been director of the bank’s treasury section (direktor sektora sredstava), and subsequently director of the bank’s financial division (direktor finansijske divizije), and since at least 1 July 2013 had been the official representative (zastupnik) of the bank.  In an interview published on 14 July, Radmanović stated that after a shareholder meeting of the new shareholders is held – presently scheduled for approximately 1 September 2013 – the bank will be given a new name to reflect its new ownership.

Balkan Investment Bank (Balkan Investment Bank а.д. Бања Лука) was founded on 4 April 2000 by Lithuania’s Ūkio Bank (AB Ūkio bankas) and its investment subsidiary, Ūkio Bank Investment Group (UAB “Ūkio banko investicinė grupė” – ŪBIG).  It opened for business on 12 June 2000.


Background data:

Basic data:

Headquarters: Aleja Svetog Save 61, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Алеја Светог Саве 61, Бања Лука, БиХ)
SWIFT Code: BALVBA22
Auditor: Deloitte d.o.o. Banja Luka (Deloitte д.о.о. Бања Лука)


Market position of the bank

(The following data were published in the ABRS’s quarterly report on the Republika Srpska banking sector as of 31 Dec. 2012.  The report covers operations within Republika Srpska (“RS”), both the RS operations of the 10 banks based within RS and the RS operations of 7 banks based in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“FBiH”).  N.B.: The Bosnian mark (BAM) has been pegged to the euro at a rate of BAM 1 = EUR 0.51129 since 1 January 2002.)

Total assets: BAM 299,594,000 (€ 153 mln) (4.6% of total assets for the 10 RS-based banks.)
Total capital: BAM 9,101,000  (1.1% of total capital for the 10 RS-based banks.)
Number of branches: 12  (Total for the 17 banks operating in RS: 120.)
Number of other locations: 25  (Total for 17 banks: 298.)
Number of ATMs: 14  (Total for 17 banks: 374.)
Number of employees: 216 (6.7% of the total 3,206 employees of the 10 RS-based banks)


Shareholders as of 31 December 2012:

UAB Balkan Invest, Kaunas, Lithuania
41.58%
UAB Asocijuoto Turto Valdymas, Kaunas, Lithuania
25.72%
UAB Ūkio banko investicinė grupė, Kaunas, Lithuania
18.42%
Republic of Srpska Restitution Fund, Banja Luka, RS, Bosnia and Herzegovina
7.14%
Republic of Srpska Shares Fund, Banja Luka, RS, Bosnia and Herzegovina
7.14%
Total
100.00%


Summary of financial results, 2000-2012:

Annual financial results for Balkan Investment Bank,
2000-2012 (in BAM)



Year
Total assets
at yearend
(before provisions)
Net profit/loss
for year
2000
13,537,000
(partial year) -365,000
2001
49,031,000
200,000
2002
35,168,000
50,000
2003
41,650,000
306,000
2004
45,428,000
291,000
2005
80,013,000
440,000
2006
128,899,000
847,000
2007
186,026,000
875,000
2008
217,282,000
-4,468,000
2009
243,367,000
-321,000
2010
269,213,000
895,000
2011
310,712,000
1,572,000
2012
245,526,000
-33,634,000



  

  
The sudden collapse of the bank’s capital

According to unaudited financial statements signed by the bank’s management on 28 February 2013 and submitted to the Banja Luka Stock Exchange on 2 April 2013, the bank started 2012 with BAM 35,000,000 in share capital plus BAM 3,885,658 in retained earnings and BAM 4,272,530 in reserves, for total equity (укупан капитал) of BAM 43,158,188.  At the end of the year the bank had BAM 35,000,000 in share capital plus BAM 4,327,982 in reserves, but a loss for the year of BAM 30,227,027 had eliminated its retained earnings and reduced its equity to just BAM 9,100,954.

In fact the change in the bank’s situation had come about rather quickly.  Financial statements published by the bank for the first half of 2012 show the bank at midyear with a pre-tax profit of BAM 650,000, taxes of BAM 141,000, and a net profit of BAM 509,000 for the first half of the year.  In other words, a net profit of BAM 895,000 in 2010, BAM 1,572,000 in 2011, and BAM 509,000 in the first half of 2012 were followed by a net loss of BAM 509,000 + 33,634,000 = 34,143,000 in the second half of 2012.

The notes to the audited financial statements for 2012 – particularly Note 10, “Developments in allowances of values and provisions” (Кретања на исправкама вриједности и резервисањима) – give some detail on what happened.  Whereas 2011 had seen loss reserves (provisions/allowances) increase by BAM 2,024,000, 2012 saw them soar by an additional BAM 33,798,000.  Of this increase, BAM 27,677,000 came under “loans to customers” (кредити пласирани комитентима), BAM 6,598,000 came under “accrued interest and other assets” (обрачуната камата и остала актива), BAM 1,342,000 came under “securities held for trading” (хартије од вриједности којима се тргује), and BAM 213,000 came under “contingent and contractual commitments” (потенцијалне и уговорене обавезе), while “provisions for severance payments” (резервисања за отпремнине радника) in 2012 actually reduced total provisions by BAM 8,000.

Although the bank’s financial statements do not indicate the names of the clients holding the largest non-performing loans, they do provide some additional information.

Firstly, the notes to the financial statements give generic information on the composition of the bank’s post-provisioning loan portfolio.  Note 5.2.5 gives balances for total loans by sector at yearend, and the data for 2010-2012 is as follows:


Sector breakdown of Balkan Investment Bank loan portfolio at yearend,
2010-2012 (in BAM)



2010
2011
2012
Agriculture, Hunting, and Fishing
7,215,000
10,072,000
13,123,000
Mining & Industry
37,415,000
46,943,000
48,180,000
Energy
1,011,000
1,914,000
1,185,000
Construction
4,316,000
5,743,000
6,446,000
Trading
32,294,000
45,200,000
20,539,000
Services, Tourism, and Hospitality
4,227,000
5,743,000
3,321,000
Transport, Post & Telecommunications, Communications
497,000
1,531,000
1,477,000
Finance
257,000
957,000
468,000
Real-Estate Dealing
16,102,000
21,057,000
43,193,000
Governmental & Public Entities
69,000
77,000
5,327,000
Households
50,272,000
47,960,000
36,709,000
Other
3,056,000
6,888,000
214,000
Total
156,731,000
194,085,000
180,182,000


In addition, the same Note provides a breakdown of loans by country:


Country breakdown of Balkan Investment Bank loan portfolio at yearend,
2010-2012 (in BAM)



2010
2011
2012
Bosnia and Herzegovina
137,863,000
170,280,000
162,028,000
Lithuania
7,477,000
460,000
6,340,000
USA
5,323,000
4,418,000
6,557,000
Italy
4,773,000
3,760,000
0
UK
683,000
6,977,000
4,854,000
Serbia
391,000
4,904,000
403,000
Cyprus
0
3,286,000
0
Austria
0
0
0
Montenegro
221
0
0
Total
156,731,000
194,085,000
180,182,000



Additionally, Note 5.3.1 gives a breakdown of loans by currency:





Currency breakdown of Balkan Investment Bank loan portfolio at yearend,
2011-2012 (in BAM)



2011
2012
BAM (Bosnian convertible Mark)
38,802,000
33,434,000
EUR
155,283,000
146,748,000
USD
0
0
Other currencies
0
0
Total
194,085,000
180,182,000


Finally, from Note 29 in the financial statements – “Relationships with related parties” (Односи са повезаним лицима) – it appears that the loss provisions would not have been due to deterioration in loans granted to related companies or individuals in Vladimir Romanov’s Ūkio group:


Loans to related parties for Balkan Investment Bank at yearend,
2010-2012 (in BAM)



2010
2011
2012
Supervisory board and mgmt. of bank
194,000
0
0
Energolinija d.o.o. Zvornik
0
5,010,000
4,486,000
Alumina d.o.o. Zvornik
7,708,000
6,768,000
8,442,000
Other loans
80,000
0
0
Total
7,982,000
11,778,000
12,928,000


(Because the Bosnian convertible Mark has been rigidly pegged to the euro since the introduction of the euro as a physical currency in 2002, the fact that the bank has 80.0% of its loans dominated in a foreign currency does not raise the same exchange-rate risks in Bosnia and Herzegovina that it would in most other countries.)

From the above it would appear that the bulk of the bank’s loans at end-2012 were in EUR-denominated loans to businesses in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were not related to Vladimir Romanov’s Ūkio group.

A small amount of additional information can be found in Note 5.2.4, where the loss provisions for the bank’s loan portfolio are provided for the broad categories of “credit cards”, “physical persons”, and “legal persons”.  (There is a separate category for loans to banks, but BIB had no bad loans in this category at yearend 2011 or 2012.)


Details on loss provisions for Balkan Investment Bank loan portfolio
at yearend, 2011-2012 (in 000 BAM)



Credit
Cards

Physical Persons

Legal
Persons

Total


2012
2011
2012
2011
2012
2011
2012
2011
Recoverable loans and advances
2,892
2,917
36,101
38,889
78,301
145,478
117,294
187,284
Individually provisioned loans
1,874
1,711
8,204
10,739
96,448
10,312
106,526
22,762
Total loans
4,766
4,628
44,305
49,628
174,749
154,972
223,820
209,228









Allowance for collectively provisioned loans
-454
-213
-1,157
-1,526
-1,688
-3,009
-3,299
-4,478
Allowance for individually provisioned loans
-1,843
-1,621
-6,609
-7,526
-31,887
-2,006
-40,339
-11,213
Total loss provisions
-2,297
-1,834
-7,766
-9,052
-33,575
-4,257
-43,638
-15,143









Total loans net of provisions
2,469
2,794
36,539
40,576
141,174
150,715
180,182
194,085


As is clear from the above table, total loss provisions increased from BAM 15,143,000 at end-2011 to BAM 43,638,000 at end-2012, an increase of BAM 28,495,000.  This increase is more than accounted for by an increase of BAM 29,881,000 in allowances for individually provisioned loans to legal persons, from BAM 2,006,000 at end-2011 to an astonishing BAM 31,887,000 at end-2012.  Considering that the bank started 2012 with equity and accumulated loss reserves of BAM 41,613,213, this single provisioning item for “legal persons” in 2012 wiped out fully 76% of the bank’s net worth.

Putting together all of the above, it is clear that the massive and unprecedented loss registered by BIB at the end of 2012 came from an increase in provisioning for individually provisioned loans denominated in euros that were granted to legal persons (i.e., businesses and government) located in Bosnia that were not related to the Romanov/Ūkio group.

To sum up, the financial statements make it seem that the sudden skyrocketing in BIB’s non-performing loans in the second half was not related to the troubles that were beginning to pull down Romanov’s Ūkio group in Lithuania, Scotland, and elsewhere.  Given that there were no large economic disruptions in Bosnia in the second half of 2012, no major bankruptcies, and no important changes to accounting standards, then the bank’s financial statements, if accurate, would seem to indicate that the explosion in the bank’s loss reserves that took place in the second half of 2012 must have been due to a drastic reevaluation of the categorization standards used by the bank for the classifying of its existing loans, especially its loans to households in Bosnia.

In fact the possible need for such a reevaluation had been mentioned by the bank’s auditor, Deloitte, in the opinion that it issued on 15 May 2012 for the financial statements of the preceding year, 2011.  The auditor stated that the opinion that it was issuing for the bank’s 2011 financial statements was a “qualified” opinion due to the auditor’s inability to verify that loss reserves for loans and accrued interest had been carried out in accordance with IAS 39 and the rules of the ABRS.


News report on recapitalization, broadcast on 2 July 2013
by Alternativna televizija (ATV)


Earlier ATV news report on RS government takeover
of bank, broadcast on 8 April 2013


Putting the pieces together

The question then becomes, what might have spurred the bank to carry out such a drastic reevaluation, wiping out 80% of its net worth in one blow?  And when was this fateful decision made?

The financial statements do not answer either question for us, but they do give us one important hint.  Note 21 to the audited 2012 financial statements mentions that as of 31 December 2012 the bank held a total of BAM 28,814,000 in deposits from banks and financial institutions.  Of this total, BAM 11,189,000 consisted of demand deposits by foreign banks in foreign currencies, and there were an additional BAM 10,327,000 in short-term deposits by foreign banks in foreign currencies.  In total, the bank was holding BAM 21,516,000 in foreign-currency demand deposits and short-term deposits by foreign banks.  The Note then goes on to explain that of this total of BAM 21,516,000, no less than BAM 21,493,000 – or 99.89% – consisted of deposits by Ūkio Bank of Kaunas, Lithuania, and that on 24 October 2012 the ABRS had imposed a temporary ban on the withdrawal of these deposits owned by Ūkio Bank.

The financial statements do not explain the motivation for this freezing of the account of Ūkio Bank at BIB, and no additional information has been made available to the public.  In fact Lithuanian media never picked up on this freezing of accounts, because by the time it became public knowledge, by the publishing of BIB’s audited and annotated financial statements for 2012 on 26 April 2013, Ūkio Bank was already dead, having had its banking license revoked by the Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania on 12 February.

In former Yugoslavia bank accounts are often blocked by the central bank or banking agency if the holder of the account (typically a business) is in arrears on taxes.  Although a number of Romanov-related companies did have operations in Republika Srpska – for example the firms “Birač”, “Energolinija” and “Alumina”, all headquartered in the town of ZvornikŪkio Bank itself had no operations in Bosnia.

Another potential motive for a banking regulator to order the freezing of a bank account is suspicion of money laundering.  It is true that in August 2012 there had been rumors in the Lithuanian media that Ūkio Bank was being investigated for money laundering, but the Lithuanian bank published a statement saying that the “investigation” in question had been spurred by the bank itself in 2006 when it received some deposits in Lithuania that it regarded as suspicious.  These deposits were being held untouched – in Lithuania – and earlier in 2012 a regional court in Lithuania had already ruled that because the deposits had no identifiable owner, they should be impounded as property of the Lithuania state.

So the freezing of the Ūkio Bank deposits at BIB was probably due neither to unpaid Bosnian taxes nor to suspicion of money laundering.  As a result, the taking of such a strong action by the ABRS must almost certainly have been a cause for alarm or worry on the part of the management of BIB, as well as at Ūkio Bank and with Vladimir Romanov himself.  But as of 24 October 2012 the problems at Ūkio Bank had not yet come to the surface: its need to acquire the remaining 95% of the stadium-development firm UAB “Žalgirio sporto arena” for EUR € 103.4 mln to avoid loan losses was not announced until 5 November, as noted earlier in this column.

Already in May 2012 the management of BIB had had to publish financial statements for 2011 that contained a proviso by the auditor, Deloitte, that the accuracy of the loss provisioning reflected in the 2011 statements could not be verified.  Whether it was this lingering doubt in the mind of the auditor, or the public disclosure of this doubt, or the freezing of the accounts of Ūkio Bank by the ABRS in late October, something must have made the management of BIB realize – sometime after the publishing of the statements for mid-year 2012 in late August 2012 –, that an investigation by the ABRS was likely to begin soon if not already underway, and that it would be better to follow the rules and immediately begin applying the mandatory provisioning standards to the fullest rather than risk being discovered by the banking agency.

A confirmation of this comes from one other direction.  On 6 March 2013 the management of BIB published the results of a public offering of shares that had recently come to a close.  The offering, which had begun on 26 November 2012, ended three months later on 28 February 2013.  The goal of the bank in this offering was to sell 500,000 shares of nominal value BAM 10 (€ 5.11) each in order to raise a total of BAM 5.0 mln in capital.  On 6 March 2013 the bank announced that by the end of the public offering a total of 150 shares had been sold, raising a total of BAM 1,500 (€ 767) in new capital, or only 0.03% of the amount desired.

The first indication that a new share offering was being contemplated appeared on 7 September 2012, when the Board of Supervisors of BIB adopted – and subsequently published – a resolution calling for the convocation of an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (the 5th), one of the items of business being the emission of the bank’s “tenth issue of securities / eighth issue of shares / second issue of non-accumulative preference shares by public offering”.

The extraordinary general meeting of shareholders took place on 27 September 2012.  (It should be remembered that the bank’s shareholders consisted exclusively of three limited-liability companies located at 60 K. Donelaičio, Kaunas, Lithuania, and two investment funds of the RS government, and only the former had voting rights.)  As expected, the voting shareholders approved a resolution to issue new stock (Issuance no. X), and a resolution to increase the share capital of the bank.  The amount to be raised was BAM 5,000,000, which, if entirely sold, would raise the bank’s share capital from BAM 35,000,000 to BAM 40,000,000.  First right to acquire the news shares was guaranteed to existing shareholders of the bank.

The shareholders passed six resolutions at the meeting.  The first three were standard and procedural, the fourth was for an increase in the bank’s capital, the fifth outlined the procedures for the issuance of the now shares, and the sixth modified the bank’s charter on five points – primarily inserting a Credit Committee (Кредитни одбор) and a Risk Management Committee (Одбор за управљање ризицима) – but without referring to any change in the bank’s capital.

The fifth resolution (number 01-3333/12) provides two reasons for the issuing of the shares, and the first of them was to increase the bank’s capital buffer.

The shares were noncumulative preferred shares that gave the owners a right to an 8% dividend annual dividend on the nominal value of their shares no later than 30 June of each year.

The resolution included a “criterion for success of issuance”: the issuance of shares was to be considered a success if 100% of the offered shares got sold within 30 days of the beginning of the offering.  If all of the shares were not sold and paid for within 30 days, then the offering was to be cancelled and the money was to be returned to purchasers.

On 17 October the bank submitted to the Securities Commission of Republika Srpska (Комисија за хартије од вриједности Републике Српске) an application for approval of a prospectus for the stock offering.  The Securities Commission considered the application in meetings held on 31 October and 7 November 2012, and at the latter meeting approved BIB’s application, requiring that the bank issue a public notice of the stock offering at least 15 days before the new shares went on sale.

On 9 November the bank published a public notice regarding the share offering, announcing that the sale of shares would begin on 26 November, and that existing shareholders would need to exercise their preemptive right to purchase the shares within the first 15 days of the beginning of the sale, i.e., through 10 December 2013.

At 9:24 in the morning on Monday, 10 December 2012, the bank announced that it would begin accepting orders for the stock via the Banja Luka Stock Exchange (BLSE): from 10 December through 14 December brokers would have the opportunity to submit bids at any price higher than the initial price, and from shortly after 9:30 in the morning on Monday, 17 December, public offers would be accepted up until the closure of the offering on 25 December.

As we have seen, despite all these procedures there was virtually no interest in the new preferred shares, particularly on the part of the existing shareholders.  As a result, on 20 December 2012 the bank applied to the Securities Commission to have the time limit of the share offer extended from 30 days to 90 days, and on 26 December the commission approved the request.

As noted above, on 6 March 2013 the bank published a notice stating that by the end of the 90-day public offering period, which closed on 28 February 2013, only 150 shares (BAM 1,500) had been sold.

From the above, it is clear that on 27 September 2012, when the voting shareholders – all of them Lithuanian limited-liability companies – approved the resolution for the new share offering of BAM 5,000,000, they must still have had no idea that a massive write-down of BAM 34,143,000 would wipe out 80% of the bank’s share capital at yearend.  And perhaps they still had no idea of this impending doom when they filed their request for the stock offering with the Securities Commission on 17 October.  It is also clear that once the sale had begun, by the time the 15-day period for existing shareholders to exercise their preferential purchase option expired on 10 December the existing shareholders must have realized that any money they might invest in this new stock would surely be lost.  So between 27 September and 10 December the existing shareholders – not just the three Lithuanian companies but also the two RS public investment funds – must have learned something that made them flee in fear from the stock offering.

Given that the auditor’s qualified opinion on the loss provisioning contained in the 2011 financial statements had been transmitted to management on 15 May 2012 and the ABRS’s order to freeze the Ūkio Bank accounts was issued on 24 October 2012, it was more likely the latter than the former that made the shareholders abandon all interest in the stock offering between 27 September and 10 December.


Edvinas Navickas, elected to 4-year terms as CEO and sole officer of the bank
in Dec. 2005 and Nov. 2009, removed in July 2013 before the end of his second term.
Above: photo used in 2001 and 2002 annual reports.
Below: photo used in 2009 and 2010 annual reports.


The road to recapitalization

As we have seen above, on 6 March 2013 the bank had been forced to reveal to the world that the stock offering had been an atrocious failure, as not even the bank’s current shareholders had been interested in investing as much as an additional 1,000 euros in the bank.  Likewise on 28 February the bank’s management had had to sign off on unaudited financial statements for 2012 that revealed the enormous loan write-down to the public, statements that would eventually be made public on 2 April.

At this critical juncture, on 18 March the President of the bank’s Supervisory Board – Ms. Angele Dementavičiūtė of Lithuania – adopted a resolution calling for the convocation of another extraordinary general meeting of shareholders (the 6th), on 8 April 2013 at 14:00.  Among the items on the agenda were the reviewing and approving of the 2012 annual financial report, and two new share issuances, to be carried out simultaneously, one to decrease the bank’s share capital and one to increase it.  One interesting item of business was the replacement of the bank’s Supervisory Board.  When the meeting convened in the headquarters building of BIB in Banja Luka on 8 April, one resolution passed by the voting shareholders dismissed the entire Supervisory Board, which at the time consisted of the following:

1. Angelė Dementavičiūtė, President.
2. Carl Håkan Källåker, Member.
3. Irmantas Degutis, Member.
4. Laura Ivaškevičiūtė, Member.
5. Skrimantaus Sutkus, Member.

The next resolution to be passed named the following individuals to the Supervisory Board:

1. Vladimir Romanov, President.
2. Oksana Kovtun, Member.
3. Yana Voronovych, Member.
4. Ivan Vidović, Member.
5. Dragana Tučić, Member.

The first name on the above list is none other than the famous Russian investor Vladimir Romanov, head of the entire Ūkio/Romanov group.  The fourth and fifth names on the list – Ivan Vidović and Dragana Tučić – are the executive directors, respectively, of the Macroeconomic Analysis Division and the Sales and Restructuring Division at the government-owned Republic of Srpska Investment-Development Bank (Инвестиционо-развојна банка Републике Српске а.д. Бања Лука – IRBRS).  The IRBRS manages the two public investment funds that owned non-voting, preferred shares in BIB.  The role of the two IRBRS directors on BIB’s supervisory board was to oversea the infusion of BAM 24 mln in funds into BIB via three investment funds managed by IRBRS (with an additional BAM 6 mln to come from another RS public investment fund not managed by IRBRS).  The role of Vladimir Romanov as head of the supervisory board, on the other hand, was to be an unpleasant one: to oversee the wiping out of virtually the entire investment he had made in BIB since founding the bank in April 2000: his paid-in capital of BAM 30,000,000 was to be written down to BAM 18,810, a loss of 99.94% of his investment.

The extraordinary general meeting of shareholders established a detailed procedure by which two simultaneous stock issuances would be used to write down the bank’s loss and recapitalize the bank:

1.   Issuance XI, to decrease the bank’s share capital to cover BAM 29,981,190 in losses.  The figure of BAM 29,981,190.00 is equal to the bank’s loss for 2012 (BAM 33,657,232.62) less retained earnings (BAM 3,430,204.82) and legal reserves (BAM 245,837.80).  This issuance would consist of 1,881 ordinary shares of nominal value BAM 10 each.  At the end of this issuance the bank’s share capital would total BAM 5,018,810, consisting of BAM 5,000,000 in noncumulative preferred shares and BAM 18,810 in ordinary shares.  By this issuance the BAM 30,000,000 in ordinary shares owned by Romanov’s three Lithuanian limited-liability companies would be reduced to BAM 18,810, but the BAM 5,000,000 in non-voting, preferred shares owned by the two RS public investment funds would remain intact.

2.   Issuance XII, to recapitalize the bank by increasing the bank’s share capital by an additional BAM 30,000,000 to BAM 35,018,810.  This issuance would consist of 3,000,000 ordinary shares of nominal value BAM 10 each, with a minimum purchase of BAM 100,000 per investor.  At the conclusion of this issuance the bank’s share capital would total BAM 35,018,810, consisting of BAM 5,000,000 in noncumulative preferred shares and BAM 30,018,810 in ordinary shares.  Existing shareholders would have preemptive purchase rights for the first 15 days of the offering.

As these adjustments to the bank’s capital were being prepared, in the meanwhile on 26 April 2013 the bank published its audited, annotated financial statements for 2012.  In the auditor’s opinion signed on 10 April, Deloitte noted that the losses for 2012 had reduced the bank’s capital below the threshold for capital adequacy established by the laws of Republika Srpska and the ABRS, putting into question the bank’s status as a “going concern”.  Deloitte also noted that Note 5.4.1 to the financial statements indicated that in 2013 the bank would be encountering a maturity mismatch between financial assets and financial liabilities equivalent to BAM 66,101,000 for assets and liabilities of less than one-year’s duration.  In the notes to the financial statements, the bank indicated (Note 29) that as of 31 December 2012 its capital adequacy ratio had fallen to 2%, far below the minimum of 12% established in Republika Srpska, and that its net capital amounted to only BAM 6,598,000, well below the minimum of BAM 15,000,000.

After the necessary paperwork, the two stock issues were carried out successfully:

1.   Issuance XI, to decrease the company’s share capital, was carried out internally.  The Securities Commission recorded the results of this issuance in its registry on 4 July 2013, and the Central Registry of Securities (Централни регистар хартија од вриједности а.д. Бања Лука) recorded this issuance in the central securities registry on 8 July.

2.   Issuance XII, to recapitalize the bank, was carried out publicly.  A public announcement of the sale of shares was issued on 30 April, and the sale of shares started on 1 May and concluded on 28 June.  Existing shareholders had preemptive purchase rights for the first 15 days, but none of the existing shareholders exercised those rights.  The BAM 30,000,000 in new shares were bought exclusively by 4 public investment funds of Republika Srpska: three administered by IRBRS, and one administered independently.  The Securities Commission placed the results of this issuance in its registry on 4 July, and the Central Registry of Securities recorded this issuance in the central securities registry on 9 July.

Detailed shareholder data published weekly by the Central Registry of Securities reveal how the capital of the three Romanov-controlled Lithuanian companies was diluted almost to zero while RS public investment funds recapitalized the bank.

Below is the shareholder structure of the bank as of 4 July 2013, before the registry changes that were carried out on 9 July:

Shareholder
% of
all shares
% of
voting shares
UAB “Balkan Invest”, Kaunas, Lithuania
41.5692857
48.4975000
UAB “Asocijuoto Turto Valdymas”, Kaunas, Lithuania
25.7233429
30.0105667
UAB “Ūkio banko investicinė grupė”, Kaunas, Lithuania
18.4216571
21.4919333
Republic of Srpska Shares Fund, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
7.1428571
0.0000000
Republic of Srpska Restitution Fund, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
7.1428571
0.0000000
Total
99.9999999
100.0000000


Here is the shareholder structure as of 11 July 2013, after the changes had been entered in the registry:

Shareholder
% of
all shares
% of
voting shares
Republic of Srpska Shares Fund, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
49.9999857
49.9999833
Republic of Srpska Restitution Fund, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
24.9999929
20.8359359
Guarantee Fund of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
17.1336490
19.9874679
Dev. and Employment Fund of the Rep. of Srpska, Banja Luka, RS, BiH
7.8126584
9.1139522
UAB “Balkan Invest”, Kaunas, Lithuania
0.0260431
0.0303810
UAB “Asocijuoto Turto Valdymas”, Kaunas, Lithuania
0.0161056
0.0187882
UAB “Ūkio banko investicinė grupė”, Kaunas, Lithuania
0.0115652
0.0134915
Total
99.9999999
100.0000000


As a result of the simultaneous issuances, the voting rights of the three Lithuanian firms fell from 100% to 0.06%, while the voting rights of the two public RS funds that previously had been minority shareholders in the bank rose from 0% to 70.84%.  From the above data it is possible to calculate the number of new shares bought by each of the four RS funds:

Shareholder
Shares bought
% of Issuance XII
Republic of Srpska Shares Fund
1,500,940
50.03%
Republic of Srpska Restitution Fund
625,470
20.85%
Guarantee Fund of Republika Srpska
600,000
20.00%
Dev. and Employment Fund of the Rep. of Srpska
273,590
9.12%
Total
3,000,000
100.00%


At a price of 10 BAM/share, it is clear that the three funds managed by the IRBRS invested a total of BAM 24,000,000 in the recapitalization, while the investment fund Guarantee Fund RS invested the remaining BAM 6,000,000.

Finally, as noted above, on 12 July it became known that the Banking Agency had placed BIB under a temporary administrator. 


Principal sources:
BIB announcement (Form И-ЗДР) of 8 July 2013 court registry change by bank, dated 2013-07-12: Балкан инвестмент банк а.д. Бања Лука - Извјештај о значајним догађајима (2013-07-15 13:04)
Interview of director of Banking Agency of RS: Ињац : Није уведена класична привремена управа (2013-07-12)
Interview of temporary administrator Radmanović: Влада Српске омогућила стабилно пословање банке (2013-07-14)
Interview of Snežana Vujnić, director of RS Investment Development Bank: IRB u Balkan investment banku ulaže 24 miliona KM (2013-06-25 19:02)
BIB annual financial statements, audited, 2001-2011: Izvještaji
BIB announcement of unsuccessful result of Nov. 2012 - Feb. 2013 share offering: Балкан инвестмент банк а.д. Бања Лука - Извјештај о резултатима 8. емисије акција (2013-03-06 15:19)
BIB announcement of 2012-09-07, calling for convocation of shareholder meeting on 2012-09-27: Balkan investment bank а.д. Бања Лука сазива 5. ванредну Скупштину акционара (2012-09-25 13:17)
BIB resolutions of 5th extraordinary shareholder’s meeting of 2012-09-27: Балкан инвестмент банк а.д. Бања Лука - одлуке 5. ванредне Скупштине акционара (2012-10-03 14:58)
BIB public announcement of beginning of share sales on stock exchange: Балкан Инвестмент Банк а.д. Бања Лука - Jавна понуда акција на берзи (2012-12-10 09:24)
BIB public announcement of 2013-03-18 calling of 6th extraordinary shareholder meeting on 2013-04-08 to approve share offerings XI and XII: Балкан инвестмент банк а.д. Бања Лука сазива 6. ванредну Скупштину акционара (2013-03-21 08:30)
BIB resolutions of 6th extraordinary shareholder’s meeting of 2013-04-08: Балкан инвестмент банк а.д. Бања Лука - одлуке 6. ванредне Скупштине акционара (2013-04-12 14:40)
BIB press release about results of recapitalization: Uspješno izvršena dokapitalizacija BIB (2013-07-12 16:00)
Central Registry of Securities announcements regarding BIB: BLKB
Shareholder structure as of 2013-07-04: Deset najvećih akcionara emitenata (04.07.2013) (2013-07-05)
Shareholder structure as of 2013-07-11: Deset najvećih akcionara emitenata (11.07.2013) (2013-07-12)
Link to discontinued NASDAQ OMX Baltic page with financial statements of Ūkio bankas, 1998-2012: Ūkio bankas (23.05.2013)




On 15 July 2013, after a six-month trial period, the Twitter profile of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Централна банка Босне и Херцеговине) went into official operation.  The name of the profile is “Centralna banka BiH”, and the Twitter address is the following:

@CBBiH

As of this writing the profile has published 341 tweets and has 79 followers.  The first tweet was published on 3 January 2013, and consisted of the following text:

Dobrodošli na oficijelni twitter profil Centralne banke Bosne i Hercegovine

The second tweet consisted of the same message written in Cyrillic, and the third tweet was the same message translated into English:

Welcome to the official twitter profile of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Since that day there have been no further tweets in Cyrillic, and all tweets have been published twice: first in Bosno-Serbo-Croatian using the Latin alphabet, and second in English translation.

The press release issued on the website of the central bank notes that @CBBiH will be the only official Twitter profile used by the central bank and its management.

Sources:
Centralna banka BiH @CBBiH – The official Twitter profile - cbbh.ba - Sarajevo, BiH: https://twitter.com/CBBiH (2013-07-16)




In other news, on 15 July the Austrian financial daily WirtschaftsBlatt published an interview with Austrian Finance Minister Maria Fekter in which she revealed that the deadline for the sale of the Southeast European subsidiaries of Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG, described earlier in this column, had been extended to mid-2015:

Reporter: Welchen Zeitrahmen für den Verkauf des Südosteuropa-Netzwerks gibt es?

Fekter: Wir haben um eine Fristerstreckung bis Mitte 2015 erreicht. ...

Source:





In earlier news, on 3 July 2013 the International Monetary Fund published a staff report on Bosnia and Herzegovina entitled, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Third Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Applicability of a Performance Criterion”.  The 41-page document, dated 13 June, was drawn up after a visit to Banja Luka and Sarajevo by an IMF staff team during 15-24 May 2013.  The section of the report dealing most directly with the banking system is reproduced verbatim below, with emphasis as per the original.


POLICY DISCUSSIONS

[...]

C. Ensuring Financial Sector Stability

11. The banking system is showing the effects of subdued economic activity as lending remains muted and non-performing loans (NPLs) continue to creep up. Financial sector indicators through end-March 2013 suggest that the banking system—predominantly owned by Austrian and Italian banks—remains profitable and adequately capitalized at the aggregate level. Foreign parent banks’ exposure to their BiH subsidiaries has broadly stabilized over the last several quarters. However, NPLs have edged up to around 14 percent and are likely to rise further in the near future, although provisioning stands unchanged at around 65 percent of non-performing assets. With credit growth expected to pick up only modestly, reflecting banks tightening of credit standards and weak credit demand, profitability in the sector will be adversely impacted. In this context, the banking agencies have engaged some smaller banks that exhibited tighter capital positions under the stress tests with more severe shock scenarios. A number of these banks already increased their capital. One bank in the RS, however, failed to meet minimum capital requirements after writing down non-performing loans, and the RS authorities are considering options to deal with this bank, including ways to attract new capital. While the bank is relatively small—accounting for less than 4 percent of RS banking system assets—the authorities are concerned about possible spillover effects on the system from a depositors’ loss in confidence. Fund staff has been actively engaged with the authorities providing a strategy that would limit the potential fiscal costs without creating undue risks to the banking system.

12. The authorities are taking further measures to strengthen bank supervision and the crisis resolution framework. Specifically:
·  The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CBBH) and the Banking Agencies completed the identification of systemically important banks with a view to closely monitoring financial sector developments and better assessing potential risks. The design and implementation of bottom-up stress tests for this set of banks is also envisaged.
·  The changes to Banking Agency laws to bring the treatment of confidential information in line with EU practices will help the authorities enhance cooperation with foreign bank supervisors, including by signing of Memoranda of Understanding. In addition, to facilitate information exchange among home and host country supervisors and parent banks, the authorities are planning to host a cross-border forum this fall.
·  To further strengthen the crisis preparedness toolkit, the authorities, with the assistance of Fund staff, will agree on a set of detailed procedures describing the responsibilities of and the coordination between responsible institutions in the event of a systemic financial crisis (a new structural benchmark for end-December 2013). The members of the Standing Committee on Financial Stability will be responsible for the development of such overarching contingency plans for financial stability.

13. Addressing high levels of NPLs in BiH will require a comprehensive strategy, including changes to the legal and regulatory frameworks. The authorities, together with Fund staff, have conducted a thorough review of the NPL resolution framework, including an evaluation of laws and regulations as well as current practices. The review has identified a number of measures to be implemented over time with further support from IMF staff. In particular:
·  Maintaining adequate provisioning levels is key to absorbing possible deteriorations in asset quality. A new law on corporate income tax in the Federation should clarify the tax treatment of loan loss provisioning by banks with a view to encouraging such provisioning. The RS will also review and enhance its tax treatment of loan loss provisioning to achieve the same objective.
·  The sale of NPLs to third parties, an effective method to improve liquidity management in banks and cleaning banks’ balance sheets, will be facilitated by submitting legislation, in line with Fund staff recommendations, regulating the establishment and supervision of asset management companies to the respective entity parliaments (new structural benchmarks for end-June 2014). This new legislation will fill the vacuum that currently exists and clear up the uncertainty that currently surrounds loan sales.
·  Other legislation influencing the NPL resolution framework will also be reviewed and amended as needed. In particular, the corporate insolvency laws should be revised to: (i) strengthen restructuring provisions so that companies that are viable can be quickly reorganized; (ii) reduce barriers to entry into bankruptcy, as these delays lessen both the chances of a successful reorganization and creditors’ recoveries; and (iii) speed up bankruptcy proceedings which can currently extend for many years.
·  Consideration should also be given to establishing an out-of-court restructuring mechanism so that viable companies have a better chance of remaining productive.
·  Finally, the law on protection of consumers of financial services under preparation in the Federation should clarify the rights and obligations of such consumers with a view to ensuring well-balanced rights and obligations of both lenders and borrowers.

14. A comprehensive overhaul of both entities’ banking laws is needed to keep up with ever more complex financial markets. Financial sector developments in BiH have highlighted the need to further strengthen financial sector legislation and regulation. Thus, the entities’ Ministries of Finance and Banking Agencies, and the Deposit Insurance Agency, with assistance of the Fund staff, will prepare and submit to the respective entity parliaments new laws on banks and other lending institutions in line with Fund staff recommendations (new structural benchmarks for end-June 2014). These laws, meant to replace the existing banking laws, will represent a significant step toward modernizing and harmonizing BiH’s legal and regulatory framework on banks with EU legislation and will also further expand the toolkit for dealing with problem banks. The Deposit Insurance Agency Law will also be reviewed and amended as needed to guarantee full consistency with the new laws. Moreover, the establishment of a bank restructuring agency should also be considered.

Source: