Friday, June 14, 2013

Belarus – Nominal volume of bank payments in Belarus grew by 63% in 2012; Interest rates on BYR deposits and loans declined in May 2013 but interest rates in foreign currencies held steady; IMF staff report on Belarus urges rapid market liberalization, ending of social subsidies, and increased FDI


On 11 June the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (Нацыянальны банк Рэспублiкi Беларусь – NBRB) published data on the payments system in Belarus in 2012.

Payments are carried out primarily through the Belarus Interbank Settlement System (BISS), which is operated by the Accounting Center of the central bank.  BISS, which on 1 January 2013 had 35 direct participants and 103 indirect participants, operates Monday through Friday from 09:00 to 17:30:  Electronic payment documents and e-mails are exchanged from 09:00 to 16:45, and from 16:45 to 17:30 settlement is carried out among banks and between banks and the central bank.

The data published on 11 June for payment turnover in 2012 indicate that while the number of payment instructions (платежные инструкции) increased only 2.1% in 2012, from 188.3 million to 192.3 million instructions, the total volume of payments increased by 63.0%, from BRY 6.246 qdln in 2011 to BRY 10.183 qdln (€ 898 bln) in 2012. (On 31 Dec. 2012 one euro equaled 11,340 Belarusian rubles (BRY), and one USD equaled 8,570 BRY.)

The growth was fastest outside of the central bank at commercial banks, where the volume of payments increased by 73.7% in 2012, from BRY 3.838 qdln to 6.665 qdln, despite an increase in payment instructions of only 0.6%, from 124,735,463 to 125,509,574 instructions.

The astounding growth in the volume of payments is presumably due in large part to the episode of hyperinflation that Belarus experienced in the second half of 2011 and the first half of 2012, after the central bank first on 24 May 2011 devalued the Belarusian ruble by 53.1% against the euro and 56.3% against the US dollar, and then on 20 October 2011 abandoned the fixed exchange-rate system in favor of a floating-rate system, causing the currency to lose an additional 34.2% in one day.

(N.B.: According to official inflation figures from the NBRB, the consumer price index in Belarus rose 23.1% between January 2012 and January 2013, while core inflation during the period is reported as 18.2%.  Price increases over the period were lowest in non-food products (9.8%) and highest in paid services (41.9%) and construction (30.2%).)


Chairperson of the Board (Старшыня Праўлення), NBRB


Separately, on 14 June the NBRB published updated data for average interest rates for new loans and deposits in Belarus in May 2013.  The data cover new deposits and new loans handled by banks throughout the month of May.

In May trends from earlier months continued, with lower inflation expectations for the BRY leading to declining interest rates in all categories: deposits and loans, short-term and long-term, legal persons and natural persons.  The decline was sharpest in interest rates for new demand deposits from legal persons, which declined from 14.2% p.a. in April to 9.0% in May, and for new loans of over one year to legal persons, which declined from 22.8% to 15.3%.  The smallest declines were seen in loans of up to one year to natural persons, from 33.8% to 33.2%, and in loans of over 1 year to natural persons, from 29.7% to 28.2%

The data also include weighted interest rates for all foreign currencies lumped together.  The demand deposit rate for legal persons, which in recent months has been very volatile, in May jumped to 5.6% from 2.1% in April.  But because these data apply to all currencies together, this jump could indicate a switch in new corporate demand deposits from one currency to another, such as from the euro to the Russian ruble.  All other categories of average deposit and loan interest rates in foreign currencies remained virtually unchanged from April to May.  For instance the rate on new deposits of over one year from legal persons rose from 5.4% in April to 5.6% in May, the rate on new deposits of over one year from natural persons rose from 5.8% to 5.9%, and the rate on new loans of over one year to legal persons rose from 8.9% to 9.0%.

Sources:
NBRB press release announcing free float of BRY from 2011-10-20: ПРЭС-РЭЛІЗ: О введении единой торговой сессии (2011-10-18)
NBRB – Interest rates on the credit and deposit market: Динамика ставок кредитно-депозитного рынка (updated 2013-06-14)
NBRB – Explanation of methodology for interest rate data: БЮЛЛЕТЕНЬ БАНКОВСКОЙ СТАТИСТИКИ № 4 (166) (2013-05-22), pp. 246-247, “Таблица 4.6 Динамика средних процентных ставок финансового рынка Республики Беларусь”



In other news, on 12 June the International Monetary Fund published a country report on Belarus.  The principal part of the country report is a staff report that was completed on 9 May after a round of discussions held on 14-25 March in Minsk.

The staff report has strong words for the way Belarus presently operates: “Belarus’ economic model is increasingly untenable, resulting in poor policy outcomes. The Belarus economy is the least reformed in Europe and high state control of the economy restrains productivity growth and competitiveness. Short-term policy efforts to boost growth beyond the economy’s capacity resulted in large external imbalances and a crisis in 2011 and caused new volatility in 2012. The authorities’ 8½ percent growth target for 2013 jeopardizes attainment of the 12 percent inflation target, and risks a repeat of the stop-go policy pattern of 2012.”

The staff report strongly encourages the Belarusian authorities to pursue a policy of privatization, price liberalization (removal of price controls), speedy dismantling of social protections such as subsidized lending, utilities, and transport, and accession to the WTO, predicting that the implementation of these structural policies would bring considerable positive benefits to the country: “Structural reforms would bring improved macroeconomic stability, competitiveness gains, and increased flows of FDI. Indeed, previous staff analysis suggests that deregulation to the level of Eastern Europe’s most liberalized economies could raise Belarus’ potential growth by up to 6 percentage points during the catch-up phase.”

Below are reproduced verbatim the sections of the staff report that deal with monetary policy and banking, with emphasis as per the original.


POLICY DISCUSSIONS

[...]

B. Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy: Focusing on Price Stability

17. The monetary stance is at risk of being too loose. The authorities are aiming to achieve 12 percent inflation at end-2013 in the context of an incomplete monetary framework centered on a short-term inflation objective with supporting benchmarks for monetary aggregates, and a flexible exchange rate. A lack of forward looking elements and the ad hoc use of multiple instruments—policy rates, reserve requirements, and administrative measures—are key weaknesses of the framework. The presence of large volumes of subsidized credit and the increasing importance of foreign currency lending further complicate the conduct of monetary policy. The current policy stance is difficult to assess, including because of the sharp volatility in inflation in the first months of 2013. However, unless the most recent declining inflation trend is sustained, the 12 percent target is likely to remain out of reach this year. Also, the marked loosening of liquidity conditions in recent months on increased NBRB liquidity support raises risks (Figure 6).

Policy Discussion

18. Staff urged the NBRB to tighten liquidity conditions and stand ready to take further steps to ensure disinflation. In the context of large uncertainty about the likelihood of further inflation reductions—which will be needed to bring inflation within the 12 percent target—and continued high inflation expectations, a multi-pronged approach is required. First, the NBRB should tighten liquidity to align the money market rate with the refinancing rate, and narrow the policy rate corridor to reduce interest rate volatility. Second, it should use macro-prudential policies to rein in high foreign currency lending growth (see also below). Third, if the recent inflation reductions are not continued over the next few months, an increase in policy rates will be needed to ensure further disinflation. The NBRB should also raise rates without delay if expansionary wage or directed lending policies were to jeopardize stability, or if significant downward exchange rate pressures were to reemerge. The NBRB should refrain from administrative measures to curb commercial lending rates, as these obscure the policy stance and unduly inhibit the operations of banks.

19. The aim should be for single-digit inflation by no later than 2014. In this context, staff encouraged the NBRB to make progress toward adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) framework but underscored that a successful eventual transition to IT would require consistent macroeconomic policies and broader structural reforms, including enhanced NBRB autonomy, sharply reduced directed lending, and strengthening of market mechanisms in the financial system.

20. The flexible exchange rate needs to be maintained to cushion against shocks and mitigate external imbalances. Intervention should generally be limited to smoothing excessive exchange rate volatility, while not obstructing the underlying trend in the exchange rate. This said, given the low reserve levels and the absence of indications of rubel undervaluation, the authorities should seize on opportunities to build reserves during periods of appreciation pressures.

21. The authorities shared staff’s concerns regarding inflation, but disagreed on the policy response. The NBRB and the government conceded that the inflation outlook is uncertain and that bringing inflation down to 12 percent by year-end would be a challenge. The NBRB indicated it is therefore planning a cautious approach regarding further monetary policy loosening. Given recent low investment and GDP growth, however, it did not see a need for policy tightening in the near future. The government suggested that inflationary pressures could be kept in check by postponing planned administrative price increases, and it was preparing to do so.

22. The authorities reaffirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate. They agreed that the exchange rate had been more stable than the inflation-differential with trading partners warranted and acknowledged deteriorating competitiveness. However, this phenomenon was ascribed to an increase in FX supply related to high FX borrowing for rubel spending needs. The authorities also emphasized the need for gradual exchange rate adjustments, given the heightened sensitivity of the population to sharp rubel movements and the attendant risk of capital flight.

C. Banking Sector Vulnerabilities

23. Banking supervision is improving but rapid FX lending growth bears close watching. Recent improvements in the banking code that enhance supervision and improve corporate governance in banks constitute progress in the institutional framework. However, reported NPLs—which likely overstate true loan quality1—have risen considerably suggesting ongoing asset quality deterioration. Even as the reported capital adequacy ratios remain at seemingly comfortable levels, owing partly to transfers of assets to the Development Bank, this calls for intensive supervision. Meanwhile, rapid FX lending growth—spurred by the large interest rate differential on rubel loans—is posing prudential concerns as much of the lending is to unhedged borrowers. The NBRB has taken measures to curb the growth, including though provisioning requirements and restrictions on banks’ short-term FX lending. However, their effectiveness has been limited and some measures are under pressure as the government has called to end the NBRB’s ban on FX lending to households, in a bid to revive mortgage lending.

1 Official NPL figures may underestimate the true share of problem loans because of loan rescheduling by state banks and a high share of government guaranteed loans.

Policy Discussion

24. Staff urged consideration of further measures to curb FX lending growth. In particular, staff suggested considering higher risk weights for FX loans. It also argued strongly in favor of maintaining the prohibition of FX lending to households—the elimination of which would risk exposing households to large FX risks.

25. The NBRB shared the staff’s concerns, but the government was more sanguine. The NBRB was deeply concerned about FX lending growth and indicated it would consider further steps, as suggested by staff, even though they considered their stance as already very firm and worried about the potential for circumvention of measures. The government, however, was more concerned about the stifling effect on growth of the high domestic interest rates and argued that risks from increased FX exposure were acceptable, given the need to boost lending and spur economic growth.

Sources: