Friday, April 5, 2013

Lithuania – SEB Bankas granted permission to redeem € 100 mln of bonds issued by Swedish parent company; SEB shareholder meeting approves merger of struggling leasing subsidiary into bank; IMF publishes country report on Lithuania concluding that banking sector is well capitalized and liquid



 On 3 April the Central Bank of the Republic of Lithuania (Lietuvos bankas) granted approval to SEB Bankas (AB SEB bankas) to redeem €100 mln of debt securities of indefinite maturity that it was holding.  The subordinated bonds in question were issued by Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) of Sweden, the 100% owner of SEB Bankas. SEB Bankas had included these bonds in its Tier II capital through permission granted by the central bank on 10 March 2010.

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Several days earlier, on 29 March, SEB bankas held an annual general meeting of shareholders.  One of the matters decided at the meeting was that the leasing subsidiary of the bank, AB “SEB lizingas”, would be merged into the bank.  Up to the present the leasing subsidiary has been a 100% subsidiary of the bank, with its results being consolidated into the financial statements of the bank itself.

The performance of the leasing subsidiary has been rather consistently disappointing, so that as of 31 December 2012 the bank had net outstanding loans to AB “SEB lizingas” of LTL 731.0 mln (€ 211.7).  As of the same date the total cost of the bank’s investment in AB “SEB lizingas” (before impairment) stood at LTL 708.6 mln, and total impairment was LTL 435.6 mln, leaving a total cost of investment (grynoji investicijos vertė) of LTL 273.0 mln (€ 79.1 mln).  As of 22 February 2013 the bank itself had 1,766 employees, while AB “SEB lizingas” had 42 employees.

Sources:
Central bank announcement: 2013 m. pranešimai apie esminius įvykius
SEB Bankas audited, consolidated financial statements for 2012: AB SEB bankas 2012 metų nepriklausomo auditoriaus išvada, metinis pranešimas ir finansinės ataskaitos (2013-03-13)




In earlier news, on 28 March the International Monetary Fund published a country report on Lithuania.  The section of the report that deals directly with the banking sector is reproduced below verbatim.  (Emphasis as per original.)


RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

[...]

B. The Banking System

9. The largely foreign-owned banking system is, overall, well capitalized and liquid. Banks’ capital was further strengthened in 2012 as dividends were not paid out: regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets improved from 13.9 percent at end-2011 to 14.2 percent at end-2012. The banking sector’s liquidity ratio stood at 40.4 percent, well above the regulatory minimum (30 percent). Preliminary calculations by the Bank of Lithuania (BoL) indicate that banks are compliant with future Basel III requirements, with the Tier 1 capital ratio at 11.5 percent, leverage ratio at 8.6 percent, liquidity coverage ratio at 192 percent, and net stable funding ratio at 161 percent. NPLs fell to 13.9 percent at end-2012, down from 16.3 percent a year before. At the same time, bank profitability declined amid excess liquidity, slow credit growth, and low net interest margins. Return on equity fell from 15.2 percent at end-2011 to 6.6 percent at end-2012.

10. But four credit institutions were intervened since the last Article IV Consultation amid rising loan losses. Snoras bank—at the time the largest domestically-owned bank, third largest bank by deposits, and fifth largest by assets (10 percent of system assets)—was liquidated in late 2011, as the bank became insolvent due to alleged fraud and misappropriation of assets (Annex I). The government financed the payout of insured deposits through a loan to the deposit insurance agency, but is expected to be largely reimbursed by Snoras’ bankruptcy estate. In late 2012/early 2013, two small credit unions were closed as rapid lending growth and some related-party lending had given rise to large loan losses and insolvency. On February 12, 2013, another domesticallyowned bank (the largest after the liquidation of Snoras, with about 5 percent of system assets) was intervened and subsequently declared insolvent, after it was unable to raise sufficient capital to absorb losses and address problems of related-party lending. After an initial report by the temporary administrator, a domestically-owned bank with significant EBRD participation signed an agreement to take over a portion of the intervened bank’s assets (the “good” assets) and liabilities (insured deposits) and to resume banking services by March 5, 2013. The value of the assets that were taken over was based on an external auditor’s initial report. A more comprehensive asset valuation exercise will be undertaken, with results expected in three months. The government is expected to provide a loan to the deposit insurance agency to cover the shortfall between good assets and insured deposits, which could amount to ¾ percent of GDP. In all cases, confidence in the banking system was maintained, largely as a consequence of the authorities’ clear and careful communication to the public and swift action to provide depositors with access to their funds.

11. Credit continued to stagnate in 2012. The economic recovery has continued despite nearly four years of negative private sector credit growth. Uncertainty about growth prospects both in Lithuania and abroad have no doubt hampered the demand for credit. At the same time, lending standards have been tight, caused by banks’ continued risk aversion, which seems to partly reflect lingering NPLs. Outflows to parent banks, which were especially sizeable in the first half of 2012, were largely matched by deposit growth. As a result of these developments, banks’ liquid assets increased to 25 percent of total assets.


The report also contains a lengthy but highly readable account of the bankruptcy and resolution of Snoras Bank (AB bankas SNORAS), which collapsed in November 2011: “Appendix: The Rise and Fall of Snoras Bank”.  The account, authored by Greetje Everaert, an economist at the IMF’s European Department, provides considerable detail on the demise of the bank and a precise chronology of events.  But in the wake of the much-discussed Cyprus depositor “bail-in” it is worth noting that this written account does not discuss the fate of “uninsured deposits” – whether deposits categorically excluded from coverage or deposits that exceed the insured ceiling of € 100,000 – since at the moment the matter is still up in the air.

In fact the best estimates are that the recovered assets of Snoras Bank will not cover all of the bank’s liabilities.  As a result, whether holders of uninsured Snoras deposits will receive anything at all through the bankruptcy process will depend in part on the outcome of a case currently pending before Lithuania's constitutional court, a case which considers whether Lithuania’s deposit insurance fund (Valstybės įmonė “Indėlių ir investicijų draudimas”) should be considered an ordinary creditor or should have precedence over other creditors, with holders of uninsured deposits holding fourth place among creditors in order of precedence.

Sources:


Mark Pleas
Eastern Europe Banking & Deposits Consultant