Thursday, February 13, 2014

Czech Rep. – Central bank researchers publish a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work, revealing who are the winners and losers in open-market operations



On 31 January 2014 the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka – CNB) published online a research paper regarding monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic.  The paper, submitted in October 2013 and published on 31 January in the central bank’s series of Research and Policy Notes, was written by six researchers at the Czech National Bank and one Czech consultant in Washington, DC.

The abstract of the paper reads as follows:


What We Know About Monetary Policy Transmission in the Czech Republic: Collection of Empirical Results


Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Michal Franta, Dana Hájková, Petr Král, Ivana Kubicová, Anca Podpiera, Branislav Saxa

This paper concentrates on describing the available empirical findings on monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic. Besides the overall impact of monetary policy on inflation and output, it is useful to study its individual channels, in particular the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, and the wealth channel. The results confirm that the transmission of monetary impulses to the real economy works in an intuitive direction and to an intuitive extent. Our analyses show, however, that the global financial and economic crisis might have somewhat slowed and weakened the transmission. We found an indication of such a change in the functioning of the interest rate channel, where elevated risk premiums played a major role.

JEL [Journal of Economic Literature classification] codes: C11, C32, E44, E52, E58

Keywords: Bayesian, monetary policy transmission, time-varying parameters, VAR [vector autoregression] model


Although the paper is not entirely concerned with interest rates, it nevertheless contains a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work.  The explanation is reproduced in full below:


2. Setting the Stage: Stylized Description of Monetary Policy Transmission and Empirical Literature Review

2.1 Stylized description of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation

The basic scheme of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation is depicted in Chart 2.1.1. Therefore, we focus on conventional monetary policy in this description and abstract from various unconventional measures. The primary transmission channels include the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the credit channel, and the asset price channel. The importance of particular channels in a particular economy depends on the openness of the economy, its financial system development, as well as the role of the banking sector. Other channels of monetary policy transmission include the expectations channel and the risk-taking channel.

Through the interest rate channel, monetary policy influences the real economy by changing key interest rates. As consumption, saving, and investment decisions are typically based on long-term interest rates, the first necessary condition for effective monetary policy is a functioning channel of transmission of monetary policy interest rates to financial market interest rates.2 The changes in financial market interest rates influence the costs of interbank borrowing, to which banks subsequently react by adjusting their deposit interest rates (the alternative bank financing cost). At the same time, the changes in the cost of bank financing influence the interest rates on loans provided by banks. In the end, client interest rates on deposits and loans enter the optimization process of economic agents in terms of intertemporal substitution or valuation of economic projects.

2 This transmission typically works due to the no-arbitrage relationship between these two types of interest rates. The elevation of spreads between monetary policy interest rates and financial market interest rates during the global financial crisis was in contradiction with this assumption. This paper abstracts from this issue.

The existence of imperfect information and substitution between financial assets in bank-based economic systems cause the transmission of interest rate changes to be inhomogeneous across economic agents (credit channel).3 The heterogeneity of effects on firms is caused mainly by the availability and value of collateral, and is reflected in the availability and conditions of loans (financial accelerator, balance-sheet channel); firms with worse financial positions are affected by a monetary policy tightening more than firms with good financial positions. In the case of banks, the credit channel is linked to agency costs and the strength of bank balance sheets, which determine the external premium of bank financing and banks’ access to external sources and influence the changes in the credit supply after monetary policy changes.

3 For the purposes of this publication, the existence of the credit channel in the Czech Republic was analyzed using the methodology of Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) using monthly data for 2004–2009. However, the results do not appear to be robust enough, therefore credit channel analysis is not included in the following text.

The effect of the exchange rate on inflation is especially substantial for very open economies. An exchange rate shock has a direct effect on consumer inflation through prices of imported consumer goods. Indirect effects include the price effects of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, changes in the domestic prices of raw materials and intermediate goods, and changes in the monetary policy stance.

Figure 2.1.1: Primary Transmission Channels Between Change in Key Monetary Policy Interest Rates and Inflation


The asset price channel can cause asset price adjustments induced by interest rate changes to influence the value of households’ and firms’ balance sheets, which is reflected in their confidence in the economy. The effectiveness of this channel for households is conditional on their perceptions about whether growth in real estate prices and financial asset prices increases wealth and is a source of consumption spending. In the case of firms, growth in a firm’s stock market value makes investment capital relatively cheaper (Tobin’s Q).


Because the authors are economists, they naturally overlook in the figure above (but do not overlook entirely in the text of the paper) what is perhaps the most crucial link in the entire chain.  Between “INTEREST RATE CUT” and “Decrease in market interest rate” there should be inserted a step entitled “Flooding of market with low-interest liquidity via open-market operations”.

Indeed if the central bank did not enter into competition with savers by temporarily (in the case of a repo) creating money out of nowhere and lending it at below-market interest rates to financial institutions, then financial institutions would be forced to obtain these necessary funds by turning to savers and offering them attractive interest rates on deposits.  Open market operations are, by their very nature, anti-market operations, intended to de-level the supply/demand playing field and give one side an advantage.  If, conversely, the central bank were to give preference to depositors instead of banks, such as by bypassing banks and soliciting deposits directly from savers and paying them 20% a.p.r. interest, then it would be the banks that would suffer and the savers who would win.  (This latter strategy, to all appearances, has yet to show up in the “monetary policy toolbox” of a central bank anywhere in the world.)

The figure shown above indicates that the central bank’s cutting of its “policy interest rate” in the end leads – via the open-market operations that are omitted in the figure – to inflation.  That is, overall there will be no net enrichment of the nation’s economy.  But there will be an enrichment of some “economic agents” at the expense of others, and the figure makes it evident who these will be:

  1. In the exchange rate channel, the early gainers will be those who are holding significant amounts of foreign currencies, at the expense of those who are holding significant amounts of the currency that the central bank intervenes in (in this case the Czech koruna, or CZK).

  1. In the interest rate and credit channels, the early gainers will be those who have large debts, at the expense of those who have little or no debts (savers or those who consider it a virtue to live within their means).  In addition, lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios for banks will cut the losses and improve the capital adequacy of banks holding large quantities of NPLs, a gift to those who are shareholders of the more riskily run banks at the expense of those who do not own stock in risky banks.

  1. In the asset price channel, the early gainers will be those who own assets (real estate, stocks, motor yachts, etc.), at the expense of those who do not own assets, such as the poor or those who have placed their accumulated wealth in a bank in the form of savings.

In short, the authors make it clear that central-bank suppression of interest rates, carried out through temporary open-market operations (repos), leads in the end to inflation for everyone, but in the meantime is an effective means to transfer wealth from the poor and savers (especially savers who deposited their money in the domestic currency) to those who have gambled with high leverage (debt), who hold large amounts of cash in foreign currencies, who own stock in banks, or who own assets.


Sources:
Database of CNB open-market operations, day by day: History of CNB open market operations - OMO