Thursday, February 13, 2014

Czech Rep. – Central bank researchers publish a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work, revealing who are the winners and losers in open-market operations



On 31 January 2014 the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka – CNB) published online a research paper regarding monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic.  The paper, submitted in October 2013 and published on 31 January in the central bank’s series of Research and Policy Notes, was written by six researchers at the Czech National Bank and one Czech consultant in Washington, DC.

The abstract of the paper reads as follows:


What We Know About Monetary Policy Transmission in the Czech Republic: Collection of Empirical Results


Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Michal Franta, Dana Hájková, Petr Král, Ivana Kubicová, Anca Podpiera, Branislav Saxa

This paper concentrates on describing the available empirical findings on monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic. Besides the overall impact of monetary policy on inflation and output, it is useful to study its individual channels, in particular the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, and the wealth channel. The results confirm that the transmission of monetary impulses to the real economy works in an intuitive direction and to an intuitive extent. Our analyses show, however, that the global financial and economic crisis might have somewhat slowed and weakened the transmission. We found an indication of such a change in the functioning of the interest rate channel, where elevated risk premiums played a major role.

JEL [Journal of Economic Literature classification] codes: C11, C32, E44, E52, E58

Keywords: Bayesian, monetary policy transmission, time-varying parameters, VAR [vector autoregression] model


Although the paper is not entirely concerned with interest rates, it nevertheless contains a very lucid explanation of how central banks’ “interest-rate channel” for monetary policy transmission is intended to work.  The explanation is reproduced in full below:


2. Setting the Stage: Stylized Description of Monetary Policy Transmission and Empirical Literature Review

2.1 Stylized description of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation

The basic scheme of transmission from policy interest rates to inflation is depicted in Chart 2.1.1. Therefore, we focus on conventional monetary policy in this description and abstract from various unconventional measures. The primary transmission channels include the interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the credit channel, and the asset price channel. The importance of particular channels in a particular economy depends on the openness of the economy, its financial system development, as well as the role of the banking sector. Other channels of monetary policy transmission include the expectations channel and the risk-taking channel.

Through the interest rate channel, monetary policy influences the real economy by changing key interest rates. As consumption, saving, and investment decisions are typically based on long-term interest rates, the first necessary condition for effective monetary policy is a functioning channel of transmission of monetary policy interest rates to financial market interest rates.2 The changes in financial market interest rates influence the costs of interbank borrowing, to which banks subsequently react by adjusting their deposit interest rates (the alternative bank financing cost). At the same time, the changes in the cost of bank financing influence the interest rates on loans provided by banks. In the end, client interest rates on deposits and loans enter the optimization process of economic agents in terms of intertemporal substitution or valuation of economic projects.

2 This transmission typically works due to the no-arbitrage relationship between these two types of interest rates. The elevation of spreads between monetary policy interest rates and financial market interest rates during the global financial crisis was in contradiction with this assumption. This paper abstracts from this issue.

The existence of imperfect information and substitution between financial assets in bank-based economic systems cause the transmission of interest rate changes to be inhomogeneous across economic agents (credit channel).3 The heterogeneity of effects on firms is caused mainly by the availability and value of collateral, and is reflected in the availability and conditions of loans (financial accelerator, balance-sheet channel); firms with worse financial positions are affected by a monetary policy tightening more than firms with good financial positions. In the case of banks, the credit channel is linked to agency costs and the strength of bank balance sheets, which determine the external premium of bank financing and banks’ access to external sources and influence the changes in the credit supply after monetary policy changes.

3 For the purposes of this publication, the existence of the credit channel in the Czech Republic was analyzed using the methodology of Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) using monthly data for 2004–2009. However, the results do not appear to be robust enough, therefore credit channel analysis is not included in the following text.

The effect of the exchange rate on inflation is especially substantial for very open economies. An exchange rate shock has a direct effect on consumer inflation through prices of imported consumer goods. Indirect effects include the price effects of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, changes in the domestic prices of raw materials and intermediate goods, and changes in the monetary policy stance.

Figure 2.1.1: Primary Transmission Channels Between Change in Key Monetary Policy Interest Rates and Inflation


The asset price channel can cause asset price adjustments induced by interest rate changes to influence the value of households’ and firms’ balance sheets, which is reflected in their confidence in the economy. The effectiveness of this channel for households is conditional on their perceptions about whether growth in real estate prices and financial asset prices increases wealth and is a source of consumption spending. In the case of firms, growth in a firm’s stock market value makes investment capital relatively cheaper (Tobin’s Q).


Because the authors are economists, they naturally overlook in the figure above (but do not overlook entirely in the text of the paper) what is perhaps the most crucial link in the entire chain.  Between “INTEREST RATE CUT” and “Decrease in market interest rate” there should be inserted a step entitled “Flooding of market with low-interest liquidity via open-market operations”.

Indeed if the central bank did not enter into competition with savers by temporarily (in the case of a repo) creating money out of nowhere and lending it at below-market interest rates to financial institutions, then financial institutions would be forced to obtain these necessary funds by turning to savers and offering them attractive interest rates on deposits.  Open market operations are, by their very nature, anti-market operations, intended to de-level the supply/demand playing field and give one side an advantage.  If, conversely, the central bank were to give preference to depositors instead of banks, such as by bypassing banks and soliciting deposits directly from savers and paying them 20% a.p.r. interest, then it would be the banks that would suffer and the savers who would win.  (This latter strategy, to all appearances, has yet to show up in the “monetary policy toolbox” of a central bank anywhere in the world.)

The figure shown above indicates that the central bank’s cutting of its “policy interest rate” in the end leads – via the open-market operations that are omitted in the figure – to inflation.  That is, overall there will be no net enrichment of the nation’s economy.  But there will be an enrichment of some “economic agents” at the expense of others, and the figure makes it evident who these will be:

  1. In the exchange rate channel, the early gainers will be those who are holding significant amounts of foreign currencies, at the expense of those who are holding significant amounts of the currency that the central bank intervenes in (in this case the Czech koruna, or CZK).

  1. In the interest rate and credit channels, the early gainers will be those who have large debts, at the expense of those who have little or no debts (savers or those who consider it a virtue to live within their means).  In addition, lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios for banks will cut the losses and improve the capital adequacy of banks holding large quantities of NPLs, a gift to those who are shareholders of the more riskily run banks at the expense of those who do not own stock in risky banks.

  1. In the asset price channel, the early gainers will be those who own assets (real estate, stocks, motor yachts, etc.), at the expense of those who do not own assets, such as the poor or those who have placed their accumulated wealth in a bank in the form of savings.

In short, the authors make it clear that central-bank suppression of interest rates, carried out through temporary open-market operations (repos), leads in the end to inflation for everyone, but in the meantime is an effective means to transfer wealth from the poor and savers (especially savers who deposited their money in the domestic currency) to those who have gambled with high leverage (debt), who hold large amounts of cash in foreign currencies, who own stock in banks, or who own assets.


Sources:
Database of CNB open-market operations, day by day: History of CNB open market operations - OMO



Thursday, February 6, 2014

Week 6 of 2014 – Giveaway info for the week – Moldova: Bank offering USD/EUR 4.7% retail, 4.0% commercial for 12-month deposits of USD/EUR 100 or more

As a free sample for clients and potential clients, below is offered summary information on a randomly-chosen bank in Eastern Europe or Central Asia offering moderate (not particularly high) interest rates for foreign-currency retail term deposits:




Bank info:

Bank:  Moldindconbank S.A.
Headquarters:  Chişinău, Moldova (situated between Ukraine and Romania)
Founded:  1959
Total assets:  MDL* 12.82 bln (USD 981.93 mln) as of 31 Dec. 2013
   *MDL = Moldovan leu.  As of 31 Dec. 2013, USD 1 = MDL 13.0570
Total new foreign-currency deposits accepted in 4Q 2013:  equivalent to MDL 146.65 mln (USD 11.23 mln)
No. of branches and agencies:  112
No. of ATMs:  127
No. of employees:  1,063 as of 31 Dec. 2013
Recent awards:  “Bank of the Year” for 2013 in the category “Efficiency and stability” as awarded by Teleradio-Moldova
Contact info:
Phone: (+373) 22 57-67-82
Fax: (+373) 22 27-91-95
E-mail: info@micb.md
Web: www.moldindconbank.com/


USD or EUR (minimum deposit USD/EUR 100): fixed rates of 1.0% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 4.0% for 6 mos., 4.7% for 12 mos.
MDL (minimum deposit MDL 1,000): fixed rates of 2.00% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 5.25% for 6 mos., 6.75% for 12 mos.


USD or EUR (minimum deposit USD/EUR 100): floating rates of 0.0% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 3.0% for 6 mos., 4.0% for 12 mos.
MDL (minimum deposit MDL 1,000): floating rates of 2.00% a.p.r. for 3 mos., 6.50% for 6 mos., 7.50% for 12 mos.


Friday, January 31, 2014

Turkey – Central bank explains reasoning behind sudden hike in policy interest rates; Garanti Bank reports slight decline in net profit in 2013; Şekerbank to boost capital and issue bonds


The most recent issue of the Eastern Europe Interest Rate Bulletin, completed on 17 January 2014 and published here (see preceding article), pointed out that pressure was building on the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası - TCMB) to increase its interest rates.  Barely ten days later, the central bank did just that.

On the heels of a 21 January meeting of the central bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (Para Politikası Kurulu) that had decided to leave all policy interest rates unchanged, exactly one week later the same committee held a meeting at which it voted to raise most of its rates drastically.  The text of the committee’s decision was published on the morning of 29 January.  The official English translation of the text reads as follows:


DECISION OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE

The Monetary Policy Committee (the Committee) has decided to adjust the short term interest rates as follows:
a) Overnight Interest Rates: Marginal Funding Rate is increased from 7.75 percent to 12 percent, borrowing rate from 3.5 percent to 8 percent, and the interest rate on borrowing facilities provided for primary dealers via repo transactions from 6.75 to 11.5 percent.
b) One-week repo rate is increased from 4.5 percent to 10 percent.
c) Late Liquidity Window Interest Rates (between 4:00 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.): Borrowing rate is kept at 0 percent, lending rate is increased from 10.25 percent to 15 percent.
Recent domestic and external developments are having an adverse impact on risk perceptions, leading to a significant depreciation in the Turkish lira and a pronounced increase in the risk premium. The Central Bank will implement necessary measures at its disposal to contain the negative impact of these developments on inflation and macroeconomic stability. In this respect, the Committee decided to implement a strong monetary tightening and to simplify the operational framework. Accordingly, (i) one-week repo rate is increased from 4.5 percent to 10 percent; (ii) the Central Bank liquidity will be provided primarily from one-week repo rate instead of the marginal funding rate in the forthcoming period.
Tight monetary policy stance will be sustained until there is a significant improvement in the inflation outlook. Under this policy stance, inflation is expected to reach the 5 percent target by mid-2015.
It should be emphasized that any new data or information may lead the Committee to revise its stance.
The summary of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting will be released within five working days.


On the afternoon of 30 January 2014 the Central Bank published the promised summary, which explained in somewhat more detail the reasoning behind the important decision on interest rates.  The official English translation of the summary reads as follows:


SUMMARY OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING

Recent Developments

1. Recently, uncertainties in the domestic and foreign markets have increased substantially. As a consequence, Turkish lira depreciated significantly and risk indicators displayed a marked increase. Especially, since the last Monetary Policy Committee (Committee) meeting held on January 21st, heightened risk perceptions towards emerging economies have accelerated the depreciation of some emerging market currencies, leading to a deterioration in their inflation outlook.

2. Exchange rate movements  in Turkey driven by these developments have increased the risk of inflation hovering significantly above the target for an extended period. Besides rapid exchange rate depreciation, recent tax adjustments and adverse developments in food inflation were other factors contributing to the deterioration in the inflation outlook.

Monetary Policy and Risks

3. The Central Bank will not tolerate any deterioration in the price stability. To this end, the Committee assessed that, in order to prevent a deterioration in the inflation expectation and the overall pricing behavior, it would be appropriate to deliver a strong and front-loaded monetary tightening.
4. The Committee stated that tightening monetary policy under current circumstances will not only contribute to price stability, but also support the macroeconomic stability through a reduction in the exchange rate uncertainty and risk perceptions. Moreover, it was indicated that increasing the predictability of monetary policy would be helpful amid weakening capital inflows.
5. Accordingly, in order to preserve price stability, the Committee decided to implement a strong monetary tightening and to simplify the operational framework. In this respect, (i) one-week repo rate is increased from 4.5 percent to 10 percent; (ii) the Central Bank liquidity will be provided primarily from one-week repo rate instead of the marginal funding rate in the forthcoming period.

6. The Committee judges that, current policy stance will be enough to anchor inflation expectations. Under this stance, inflation is expected to reach the 5 percent target by mid-2015. Although January inflation may exceed the market expectations, tight policy stance should prevent any deterioration in medium term inflation expectations. In subsequent months, underlying inflation is expected to trend downside. The Committee indicated that tight monetary policy stance will be sustained until there is a significant improvement in the inflation outlook. If deemed necessary, liquidity policy may be tightened further in order to invert the slope of the yield curve.


Obviously a change in policy interest rates will not, by itself, change the interest rates prevailing in the economy.  Only liquidity actions (“open-market operations”) carried by the central bank using the new rates will cause a change in prevailing market rates.  But how much money has the central bank been throwing into open-market operations in recent months?  A press release published by the central bank on 17 December 2013 gave the figures:

PRESS RELEASE ON LIQUIDITY POLICY

Taking into account the decision taken by the Monetary Policy Committee on the weighted average cost of CBRT funding and projections in funding needs of the system in the forthcoming period;

1.  The maximum outstanding amount of the funding provided via one-week repo auctions will be reduced from TL 10 billion to TL 6 billion.
2.  The total amount of funding facility offered to primary dealer banks within the framework of open market operations will be reduced from 7 percent to 2 percent of the outstanding Turkish lira denominated Treasury securities purchased from Treasury auctions, the details of which can be found in the press release No. 15, dated July 06, 2007. Thus, the total amount of funds available to primary dealer banks through this facility will be reduced from TL 23,0 billion as of today to approximately TL 6,5 billion.


(At the time of the press release, 1 TL (Turkish lira, TRY) was equivalent to USD 0.490, or roughly half a dollar.)  The sharp reductions in the volume of open-market operations described in this December 2013 memo came on top of initial reductions already implemented earlier, described in a June 2013 memo:


PRESS RELEASE ON SHORT TERM ADDITIONAL MONETARY TIGHTENING

Excessive volatility has been observed in the foreign exchange market due to the international and domestic developments during the last month. Short term additional monetary tightening will be implemented in order to minimize the adverse effects of the excessive volatility on price stability and financial stability.
Additional monetary tightening (AMT) is mainly implemented via open market operations. Liquidity provided to the market at the policy rate is reduced temporarily below the lower bound announced for normal days.
In order to support the additional monetary tightening, the Central Bank may hold unsterilized intraday foreign exchange sales auctions or foreign exchange interventions when deemed necessary.
Additional monetary tightening is intended to be strong, effective and temporary. The duration of the implementation may vary depending on the progress of volatility in the foreign exchange market.


Little noticed amidst all the controversy surrounding the interest-rate decision of 28 January was a press release quietly published on 29 January:



PRESS RELEASE ON ENDING THE ADDITIONAL MONETARY TIGHTENING POLICY

In line with the simplification decision taken at the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of 28 January 2014, additional monetary tightening policy announced with CBRT’s Press Release of 11 June 2013 numbered 2013-25 will be ended as of today.


It is evident that the central bank not only intends to force interest rates upward, but that it is willing to commit a considerable amount of money (“liquidity”) to doing so.  Indeed, as can be seen from the central bank’s statistics, on 28 January, the day before this memo, the central bank accepted a total of TRY 1.0 billion in repo offers (at an interest rate of 4.50%), while on 29 January, the date of the memo, this figure leaped upwards to TRY 33.0 billion (at 10.00%), the largest daily amount ever recorded in the 17½-year history of the central bank’s repo auctions.

Sources:
Press release explaining reasoning – Turkish: Sayı: 2014-09: Para Politikası Kurulu Toplantı Özeti (2014-01-30 14:06:54)
Press release explaining reasoning– English: No: 2014-08: Summary of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting (2014-01-30 13:58:08)
Press release on ending monetary tightening policy – Turkish: Sayı: 2014 - 08: Ek Parasal Sıkılaştırma Uygulamasına Son Verilmesine İlişkin Basın Duyurusu (2014-01-29)
Press release on ending monetary tightening policy – English: No: 2014 - 07: Press Release on Ending the Additional Monetary Tightening Policy (2014-01-29)
Press release about interest rate decision – Turkish: Sayı: 2014-07: Para Politikası Kurulu Kararı (2014-01-28 23:57:50)
Press release about interest rate decision – English: No: 2014-06: Decision of the Monetary Policy Committee (2014-01-29 00:02:29)
Press release about liquidity policy – Turkish: Sayı: 2013 - 82: Likidite Politikasına İlişkin Basın Duyurusu (2013-12-17)
Press release about liquidity policy – English: No: 2013 - 63: Press Release on Liquidity Policy (2013-12-17)
Press release about monetary tightening policy – Turkish: Sayı: 2013 - 40: Kısa Süreli Ek Parasal Sıkılaştırma Uygulamasına İlişkin Basın Duyurusu (2013-06-11)
Press release about monetary tightening policy – English: No: 2013-25: Press Release on Short Term Additional Monetary Tightening (2013-06-11)
Statistics on open-market operations – repos: İhale ile Gerçekleştirilen Repo İşlemleri (all auctions since 1996; updated daily)



In other news, on the afternoon of 30 January 2014 the country’s third largest bank, Garanti Bank (Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş.), published audited financial statements for the year 2013, in both consolidated and unconsolidated forms.  The published statements were compiled in accordance with the reporting standards of Turkey’s Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA – in Turkish Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu (BDDK)), while statements according to IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have yet to be published by the bank.

(N.B.: as of 31 December 2013 the official exchange rate was USD 1 = TRY 2.1324.)

The bank’s unconsolidated, BRSA net profit (kâr veya zarar) for 2013 totaled TRY 3.006 bln (USD 1.410 bln), down slightly from the earlier year’s result of TRY 3.077 bln.  This result appears even less impressive when one takes into account that in 2013 inflation in Turkey averaged 7.40%.

The bank’s net profit for the nine months ended 30 September 2013 had been TRY 2.521 bln, so the net profit for 4Q 2013 was evidently TRY 0.556 bln, down slightly from the net profit of TRY 0.645 bln obtained in the previous quarter, 3Q 2013.  (The total net profit/loss for all 32 deposit-taking banks in Turkey as of 30 Sept. 2013 had been TRY 18.054 bln.)

Garanti Bank, founded in 1946, as of 30 September 2013 was ranked third among Turkey’s 32 deposit-accepting banks by total assets (toplam aktifler) on an unconsolidated basis, with total assets of TRY 189.82 bln (USD 93.21 bln).  In retail loans it was in 1st place, with a market share of 13.4% among deposit banks, while in commercial loans it ranked in 4th place, with a market share of 9.7%.

As of end-2013, in Turkey the bank had 990 branches and 18,611 employees.  The bank also had 6 branches in the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (94 employees), 1 branch in Luxembourg (17 employees), 1 branch in Malta (12 employees), and 1 representative office each in Germany, England, and China.  The bank is owned 25.0100% by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (Bilbao, Spain) and 20.4123% by Doğuş Holding A.Ş. (İstanbul, Turkey).  The bank’s auditor is DRT Bağımsız Denetim ve Serbest Muhasebeci Mali Müşavirlik AŞ, a member of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited.

Management signature page for 2013 financial statements

Sources:
Notice of issuance of financial statements – Turkish: Finansal Tablo Dipnot Açıklamaları (2014-01-30 17:43:39)
Audited unconsolidated BRSA financial statements for 31 Dec. 2013 – Turkish: Konsolide Olmayan Yıllık ve Ara Dönem Mali Tablolar - 2013 (2014-01-30 11:23:53)
Audited unconsolidated BRSA financial statements for 30 Sept. 2013 – Turkish: Konsolide Olmayan Yıllık ve Ara Dönem Mali Tablolar - 2013/3Ç (2013-10-23 18:24:42)
Summary of BRSA financial results of all Turkish banks as of 30 September 2013 in table form: Banka Bilgileri (Seçilmiş Tablolar, Konsolide Olmayan(Solo Banka)) - 2013 - Eylül
Inflation in Turkey in 2013: Enflasyon Verileri (updated monthly)



Also on 30 January, the board of directors of Şekerbank (Şekerbank T.A.Ş.), Turkey’s 13th largest bank by total assets (founded 1953), voted to increase the bank’s capital by TRY 125 mln, from TRY 1.000 bln to TRY 1.125 bln, through the issuance of new shares.  At the same meeting the board also authorized the bank’s management to issue up to TRY 500 mln in new bonds with a maturity of 5 years.

Sources:
Notice of capital increase – Turkish: Sermaye Artırımına İlişkin Yönetim Kurulu Kararı (2014-01-30 18:03:30)
Notice of bond issuance – Turkish: Borçlanma Aracı İhracına İlişkin Yönetim Kurulu Kararı (2014-01-30 18:05:30)




Monday, January 27, 2014

International – January-March 2014 issue of Eastern Europe Interest Rate Bulletin published

On 17 January 2014 the Eastern Europe Interest Rate Bulletin for January-March 2014 was published. 

The Bulletin features a survey of highest market interest rates for time deposits at commercial banks in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in December 2013.  In brief:  For 12-month retail deposits of USD 1,000 or equivalent, the highest rates found were USD 16.00%, EUR 15.00%, GBP 5.80%, CHF 6.10%, RUB 15.00%, JPY 3.50%, and CNY 7.20%.

The Bulletin is available in PDF format (747 kB) here.


Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Czech Rep. – Central bank publishes quarterly review of central bank monetary policy in 9 jurisdictions, with special article examining methods used to measure inflation expectations



On 9 December 2013 the Monetary and Statistics Department of the Czech National Bank (Česká národní banka) published the latest issue of its quarterly review of central banks’ monetary policy (čtvrtletník Monitoring centrálních bank), in both Czech and English.

The bulletin covers developments in monetary policy and inflation in nine jurisdictions whose central banks use inflation targeting as the cornerstone of their monetary policy: EU (ECB), USA, UK, Sweden, Hungary, Poland, Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand.

For each jurisdiction the bulletin indicates the central bank’s inflation target, the dates of recent monetary policy meetings and any changes in policy rates, the most recent inflation figures, the dates of upcoming monetary policy meetings, the dates of upcoming publications, a prediction of the direction of upcoming movements in the policy rate, and a 12-month graph of the key policy rate and the inflation rate.

This issue features an original four-page article entitled, “Inflation Expectations.”  After a brief introductory discussion of the effects of inflation expectations on price levels and the need for central banks to measure such expectations, the article gives a quick overview of the measurement methods used in the USA, the EU, and Japan, and provides a handy table summarizing recent measurements of inflation expectations in 9 jurisdictions.

The 11-page bulletin closes with a 1-page summary of a speech given on 17 October 2013 by Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ECB Conference on Household Finance and Consumption held in Frankfurt am Main.  The speech, entitled “Household heterogeneity and the transmission mechanism”, discussed the influence of household-income disparity on the success of monetary policy in the eurozone, pointing out that wealthier households have more liquid assets with which they can smooth out their consumption between good times and bad, and poorer households react more quickly to monetary policy measures such as modification of interest rates.

Sources:
ČNB review in English: Central bank monitoring - December 2013 (pdf, 222 kB) (2013-12-09 12:06:57)
ČNB review in Czech: Monitoring centrálních bank - prosinec 2013 (pdf, 356 kB) (2013-12-09 11:58:08)
Peter Praet speech in its entirety: Household heterogeneity and the transmission mechanism (2013-10-17)



Friday, November 29, 2013

Russia – Officer of RosDorBank arrested on suspicion of extortion



On the morning of 28 November 2013, police of the Interior Ministry for the Central Federal District in Moscow issued a press release stating that the first deputy CEO of an unnamed bank (первый заместитель председателя правления банка), as well as the general director of an unnamed leasing company related to the bank, had been arrested in Moscow on suspicion of extortion and receiving illegal remuneration on a large scale.

The police press release stated that searches had revealed that the two individuals had used the bank’s name under false pretenses in order to extort a total of RUB 8,200,000 (USD 247,000).  When an individual businessman, promised by the bank a commission of RUB 24,000,000 in exchange for intermediating for the bank in the buying and selling of office space in Moscow worth RUB 219,000,000, attempted to claim his commission, he was reportedly threatened by the two officers, being told that if he did not give them RUB 8,200,000 out of his RUB 24,000,000 commission, not only would he lose his commission but the RUB 219,000,000 would not be transferred to the receiver, a leasing company, causing the leasing company to go bankrupt.  The individual businessman contacted the police, and when he met the general director of the leasing company to hand over the extorted money, the general director was arrested immediately, and the first deputy CEO of the bank soon afterward.

Within an hour of the police press release, RIA Novosti, citing an anonymous source in law enforcement, identified the bank as RosDorBank.  RosDorBank (ОАО «РосДорБанк») is the shortened form of the name Russian Joint-Stock Commercial Roads Bank («Российский акционерный коммерческий дорожный банк» (открытое акционерное общество)), one of the first commercial banks in Russia, opened in 1991 to finance road construction.  As of 1 November 2013 the bank ranked #211 out of 867 commercial banks operating in Russia by assets, with net assets (after provisions) of RUB 14.92 bln (USD 465 mln).

Later in the same morning investigative authorities revealed that the two individuals had been released on bail.  By early afternoon the press had noted that the website of RosDorBank identifies its first deputy CEO as Aleksey V. Vinogradov (Алексей Викторович Виноградов).  That same day, however, RosDorBank issued a press release confirming the arrest of the manager of its risk department, Vladimir V. Podlipnov (Владимир Владимирович Подлипнов), but denying the arrest of the First Deputy CEO Vinogradov, noting that Vinogradov was present at work.

The manager of the risk department, Podlipnov, was one of five persons on the bank’s management board.  His profile has since been removed from the “Management” page of the RosDorBank’s website, but is still available in Google cache, and is reproduced below.



Below is an image of the profile data given for Podlipnov in the cached copy of the English version of the page:



Later on 28 November a video was published showing the arrest of one of the suspects and the finding of a large amount of cash inside his Lada car:

Video of arrest, with finding of money in car
(click to open page, scroll down to start video)


Police have asked for citizens affected by the activities of the detainees or who have any information about their illegal activities to contact the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Central Federal District at 6 Shabolovka Street, Moscow, or telephone 8 (499) 764-51-36.

In a noted earlier case, in May 2013 the CEO of Russia’s 9th-largest bank, Rosbank (ОАО АКБ «Росбанк»), Vladimir Golubkov (Владимир Голубков) was arrested for accepting bribes, and the bank’s Senior Vice President, Tamara Polyanitsyna (Тамара Поляницына), was arrested for complicity in bribery.

Sources:
RosDorBank press release: Пресс-релиз (2013-11-28)
RosDorBank website – Bank management: Правление Банка
Bank’s ranking by net assets as of 2013-11-01: Рэнкинги банков


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